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ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. See CONTRACT, 13.
1. Where the holder of a note surrenders it to the maker, and takes one
of less amount in satisfaction, it is a full discharge. Draper v. /itt, 49.
2. The payment of a less sum is not a sufficient consideration for an
agreement to discharge a greater, but the Code of Tennessee alters the
common law rule, and enforces such contracts when fully performed in
good fitith according to the intention of the parties. Cily of Memphis v
Brown, 629.
3. Where an agreement is made by a debtor to deliver in full satisfaction
of a larger sum due, his notes or money for a less sum, even though there
is a consideration for the agreement, it must, in order to operate as a dis-
charge, be fully and fairly performed In all its parts, both in time and
amount. Id.
4. In order to sustain a contract of settlement without other sufficient
consideration, upon the ground that it was the compromise of doubtful
cains, the doubt must be such as would arise in the mind of an ordinarily
intelligent person familiar with the class of things which is the subject of
the settlement. Id.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT. See CONTRAcT, 7.
ACTION. See A'roRNE, 5; CITIZEN, 1; M UCIPAL CORPORATION, 10: NUISANCE
2; TEN7AWT IN CommoN, 4.
1. The breaking of plaintiff's axle from an insufficient highway, where.
by his horse was startled, ran away and was killed, is but one ground of
action. 1Hodge v. Town of Bennington, 50.
2. No action lies for simply conspiring to do an unlawful act. _rtmball v.
Harman, 51.
3. An action, which if done by one, constitutes no ground of an action on
the case, cannot lie made the ground of such action by alleging it to have
been done ly a conspiracy of several. Id.
4. No action will lie to recover back money, voluntarily paid. AwaIC
v. Eutaw Building Ass., 03.
5. A promise upon a valuable consideration, to pay money to a third
person, will sustain an action by the latter against the promisor. Hal v
Robbins, 261.
ACTS OF CONG RESS.
180-2, April 14. See CouRT, 4.
1811, September 4. See VENDOR AND PURcUS E, 10.
1802, February 25. See LEOAL TEXDER, 4.
1853, March 3. See CONFEDERATE STATES, 3.
180, March 3. See DuSvaTn.
ADMINISTRATOR. See EXECUTOR
ADMIRALTY.
1. Where a collision occurs in consequence of a vessel being cut loose
from her moorings, in order to save her from sinking, it is not such an in-
evitable accident or vis majoras will exempt her from liability fordamage
resulting from the collision. SWerman v. Mott, 716.
2. In voluntarily cutting herself loose, she takes the risk of colliding,
and having collided must bear the consequence. Id.
50 (777)
778 INDEX.
ADVANCEMENT. See DECEDENT ESTATE, 6; EVIDENCE, 18.
1. Where a father conveys land to his soa, and receives a writing ac-
knowledging the receipt of the full value of the land in dollars, in full of
the son's share, and relinquishing his right the son's children will be
barred from claiming any of the grandfather's estate. Smith v. Smith, 59.
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENSE. See BILLS AND NOTEs 14
AGENT. See EViDENCz, 22; INSURANCE, 13,14; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 12.
1. Where the keeper of a boarding-house of a railroad company, had
from time to time purchased provisions for thle use of the house, and the
bill bad been paid by the company, the vendor was entitled to regard him
as agentpro tanto of the company. P. TY. and B. R. Cb. v. Weaver, 50.
2. A debtor is authorized to pay an agent entrusted with a security any
sum which is due upon it. Doubleday v. Kress' 123.
3. The ostensible authority attributed to a party entrusted With a
security is to receive payment according to its terms. Id.
4. Where a party by simple contract deals with an agent who does not
disclose his agency, he may be made liable in a suit in the name of the
principal. Culve v. Bigelow, 135.
5. When an agent purchases a note and mortgage of his principals, tak-
ing an assignment to himseif instead of a discharge, and plying the credi.
tor who is not aware of the agency, more than annual interest,the liability
of the creditor is the same as if the agent purchased in his own behalL
2d.
6. When there is testimony tending to show notice of the agency, it
should be submitted to the jury. Id. 1
7. An insurance agent to receive and transmit applications, is an agent
to receive and transmit notice. Lycoming Mut. ins. Co. v. £tdler, 191.
8. Payment of the debts of a principal by the agent, is presumed" to
be from principal's money. Woods v. Gummert, 191.
9. Where an agent secures a personal debt by a mortgage in his own
name, on his principal's property, there is no presumption that the prin-
cipal authorized it. Wa41,4ey v. Rising, 22.
10. A subsequent purchaser of the property cannot avoid a sale, made
in good faith upon sufficlent consideration, simply on the ground he was
ignorant of it. rd.
L A principal employing an agent to do an illegal act is responsible
whether the agent acts ignorantly or maliciously. Haynes v. .Tangrem,
262.
12. A person may make a demand as well through an agent as by him.
self. _erguson v. il 270.
I. The knowledge of an agent, of the adverse possession of land, is the
knowledge of his principal, and will prevent the purchase being bona f1de.
llussell v. Sweezey, 458.
14. A merchant authorized to sell all his principal's goods within a cer-
tain circuit on a commission of ten per cent., i to be regarded as a general
agent, with power to fix the price and time of payment, unless a different
usage in such trade is shown. Day Light Burner Co. v. Odcin, 658.
15. Third persons will not be affected by a limitation on his authority
unless brought to their notice, and what will be sufficient to put a person
on inquiring, isa question of fact for a jury. A4.
16. Where it is sought to make the principal liable for the acts of a
special agent, the authority of the agent must be proved. Rsh v. Davis,
719.
17. The principal is not estopped by the declarations of the agent as to his
authority. 7d.
18. Ratification in order to bind must be with full knowledge of facts,
74.
19. The fact of a principal becoming a rebel and being within the Con.
federate lines does not necessarily terminate an agency. .Fisher v. KIrat,
773.
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AGREEMENT.
1. Where after a settlement and giving a note, there is.an agreement to
pay more on a certain contingency, the agreement is not merged. Smith
v. Irolland, 59.
2. An oral agreement connected with a written contract may be proved
if subsequent. Id.
ALLE-.
An alley fenced in and owned by the contiguous lot owners is extin-
guished. Robinson v. Myers. 193.
AMENDMENT. See REAL ESTATE.
1 Amendments to be passed on by the courts, which could not affect the
verdict, may be made after verdict, and then judgment entered. ,Tanvrin
V. ybgg, 331.
2. If amendments may be made in the cause after verdict, they may also
bein thetestimony. 1d.
3. A variance between complaint and proof is immaterial after judg-
ment, and may be amended. Smith v. eolland 90.
ARBITRMTIO-T.
1. A submission to arbitration is a contract implying an agreement of
the parties to abide the result. Thitcher v. TWitcher, 50.
2. Assumpsit Is the proper action to recover damages for non-perfor.
manceofaward. 1d.
3. -Non assumpsit puts in issue every material averment. Id.
4. An award may be good in part and bad in part; but if that which Is
void is so connected with the rest as to affect the justice of the case, the
whole is void. Id.
5. The claim need not be annexed to the submission. Dodge v. Hull ci
az.. 510.
6. A common count is not vitiated by allegation of a lien claim. Id.
7. The delivery by the arbitrators of a statement of their conclusions
does not terminate their powers. They may still make a final award.
Id.
8. A submission, partly in writing and partly by parol, and an award
made in pursuance of all said terms, will be good. Steere v. Tenney, 659.
9. Arbitrators, unless restricted, can decide questions of law as well as
of fact. Sanborn v. Murpahy, 659.
10. If the reference provides that the award shall be made in accordance
with legal principles, and the referees mistake the law, the award will be
set aside. Id.
11. An award will be set aside when there has been such an error as re-
gards facts or law, as prevented a free and fair exercise of judgment. Id.
12. It is a settled rule of law and equity, that every reasonable intend.
ment shall be made to uphold an award. Id.
13. The plaintiffs were selected as arbitrators between them by T and
S and in discharging the duties of their appointment incurred certain ex-
penses for the hire of a clerk. In their award the arbitrators awarded that
T. should pay them a certain sum for their fees and expenses. In as-
sumpsit against T. to recover the sum so awarded, brought by the
arbitrators jointly, in which the declaration contained a special count
on the award and the common counts for money paid and work and labor
done, it was held that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover on the com-
mon counts, and that the fact that another was jointly liable with the
defendant was no defense under the general issue, but could be taken ad-
vantage of only by plea in abatement. Whether a recovery could be had
on the special count, queere. Holcomb v. Tiffany, 748.
ARREST.
An officer ordered to arrest a debtor and take him forthwith before a
justice is not justified in confining him in Jail. Haynes v.J'ungremn,262.
ASSUMPSIT. See AnBrrAoN, 2,13; CONFEDERATE STATES, 3; CONSTLTUrxIOiNAT
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ASSUMFSIT.
LAW, 4; CONTRACT, 15; PAYMENT, 1, 2.
1. Where the defendant refuses to compensate the plaintiff for work
done, in a particular way agreed upon, he can recover in assumpsit the
value of the labor. Stone v. Stone, 191.
2. Will not lie to recoverin money for the service ofplaintiff'sminorson,
where the contract was that the defendant should pay in boarding, cloth-
ing and schooling, the son, who voluntarily left, defendant's employment,
the latter being always ready to pay in manner stipulated. Boundy v.
'hatcher, 262.
3. For labor and services, will not lie against defendant, for services
performed by his wife's siter, upon an implied promise, where no ac-
count was kept, and during all the time the sister was supported by de-
fendant. .Bundy v. Hpde, 659.
ATTACHMENT. See DEnOR Aiin CREDIToR, 20; PARTNERSmP, 5.
1. The pendency of an attachment suit in Massachusetts, is no bar to a
suit bronght in New York by the receivers of an insurance company upon
the premium notes. O.good v. Atagnire, 191.
2. A judgmcnt in such suit might be. Id.
3. Though an extraordinary remedy, the plaintiff is to be protected
when he is within the spirit of the statute authorizing it. BRowles v.
Hoare, 59(.
4. In New York may be dissolved, for want of Jurisdiction, fraud in ob.
taining, defective papers and various other causes. Id.
5. Motion to dissolve may be made after judgment in the action. Id.
6. The plaintiff may oppose motion to dissolve, by affidavits contradict-
ing the defendants. Id
ATTORNEY. See HUSAN An Wirz, 22, 37; TRUST AiD TRUSTEE, 4.
1. A party employing an attorney has a right to his services, and to con-
fide all the facts of the litigation to him, without the danger of having
those facts used for his disadvantage. Davis v. Snith, 51.
2. An attorney, by purchasing the interest of the adversary, acquires
no right as against his client. Id.
3. Where a written contract between a county and an individual shows
upon its face that it was made by the county for the professional services
of the individual as an attorney and counselor at law, which services are
such as the law requires to be performed by ile county attorney, such
contract is prima faecie void. Clough v. Hart, 95.
4. Where a written contract, between a city of the fIrst-class and an Judi.
vidual, shows upon its face that it was made by the city for the profes-
sional services of the individual, as an attorney and counselor at law,
which services are such as the law requires to be performed by the city
attorney, such contract is prima facie void. Id.
5. Where the petition of the plaintiff sets forth such a contract as a foun.
dation for a decree for the specific performance of such coitract, but does
not set forth any facts which would show that such contract is not void,
such petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action
Id.
6. The court has no jurisdiction to strike an attorney from the roll for
an act not connected with an attorney's duties. Dicken's 0ase, 123.
7. An attempt to make an opposing attorney drunk in order to get an
advantage of him, is good ground to strike off. -7d.
9. The plaintiff's attorneys are not entitled to have a judgment entered
in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant, for their benefit, when a
default has been previously entered, and the parties have then made a
bonafel settlement, Hooper v. TIelch, 192.
9. The authority of an attorney to bring a suit will be presumed until
contrary is shown. Town of Lisbon v. Hotton, 719.
AUDITA QUERELA. See DEBTOR AND CREDIT o, 15.
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AWARD. See AIIBITRATION.
BAGGAGE. See CoMM oN CA R n, 10.
BAILMENT. See EQUITY, 13.
I. A ballee without reward of certain bonds deposited for safe keeping,
will be liable for the loss unless he uses such care as a person of common
prudence in his situation and business usually bestows in the custody of
similar property belonging to himielf. .Maury v. Coyle, 52.
2. A banker receiving a package of money as a special deposit without
compensation, is bound only for slight care, and responsible only for
gross negligence. Hale el at v. Rawallie, 52.
3. The pledgee of bonds delivered as security for a loan, is liable to an
action for conversion, if he refuses to deliver them afterpaymentof the
loan. Roberts v. .Bredell, 262.
4. The damages would be the value of the bonds with Interest. 1d.
b. The statute of limitations does not begin to run until demand and re-
fusal. id.
BANIK.
1. A depositor in a national bank which has failed and passed Into the
hands of a receiver, may set off the amount of his deposit against his debt
to tie bank on note. Platt v. Rently, 171.
2. The officers of a bank are bound to know whether the drawer of a
check is a customliof the bank and whether his account justifypayineunt.
Salt Springs Bank v. SyracuseSavings Ins., 591.
3. A cashier has no authority to discharge the debtors of the bank with-
out payment. Cochlo Nat. Bank v. Hasbik, 7-20.
4 If the cashier informs a surety that a note is paid, in consequence of
which he surrenders certain securities, the bank is estopped to deny that
such note is paid. Id.
BANKRUPTCY.
L .urisdiclion. See infrarIlI.
1. Where the United States courts have acquired jurisdiction of a bank-
rupt's estate, the State courts lose jurisdiction of all claimsprovable under
the Act. Woolfolk v. TFoolfolk. 329.
2. Whether the claim for homestead and exemption, under a State Con-
stitution. is a debt, such as may be proved before the Baukrupt Court.
is for that court alone to decide. Id. -
IL Effect of the Inslitulion of Proceedings.
3. No valid lien upon property of a bankrupt can be acquired by pro-
ceedings in a State court after tile filing of the petition in bankruptcy.
Stuart v. Miues, 86.
4. Nor is an assignee in bankruptcy bound to go into a State court to
defend a suit commenced against the bankrupt after the filing of the pe-
tition. Such an action is as to him a nullity. Id.
IIL Practice.
5. In a proceeding against a debtor as an involuntary bankrupt,
the order under section 40 of the Bankrupt Act, requiring tile debtor to
show cause why the prayer of the petition that lie be declared bankrupt
should not be gralnted, may be served personally outside the territory of
the Jurisdiction of the courtmaking it. Stuart v. lines, 8G.
6. That order need not be served by a marshal or officer of the court, but
may be served by any one authorized by the solicitor for the petitioner.
Id.
7. The rule is tle same where one or more of several partners institute
proceedings in balnkruptcy vohltarily, in which certain members of tile
partnersllip refuse to join; tie parties so refusing are proceeded against
as involuntary bankrupts, and service of the order to show cause why
they should not he declared bankrupt may be made on them, outside the
territorial jurisdiction of tile court, and by a person other than the execu-
tive officer of the court. Id.
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BANKRUPTCY.
8. Accordingly, where such an order, made inthe District Court of the
United States for the Southern District of New York, in a case where the
application was by certain members of apartnership against certain other
members refusing to join in the application, was served personally on the
debtor in New Jersey, by a person other than the executive officer of the
court, but authorized by the solicitors for petitioner: Held, such service
was correct as to place and mode. Id.
IV. Acts of Bankruptcy.
9. Insolvency as used in the Bankrupt Act, when applied to a trader
means inability to pay his debts as they become due. Toop v. Martin,
124.
10. A transfer by an insolvent debtor with a view to secure his property
to one creditor, and thus prevent an equal distribution, is a transfer in
fraud of the Act. Id.
V. .Proof of Debts.
11. A creditor who has a mortgage of a bankrupt's homestead, as seen-
rity for his debt, may prove his debt and vote for an assignee. Matter of
J B. Stlltwell, 706.
VI. Discharge.
12. A discharge will not prev'ent a creditor who obtained a lien upon a
fund by attachment prior to the commencement of proceedings, from tak-
inga decree in rem against the fund. Stoddard v. Locke, 52.
13. In order to avoid a defendant's discharge under the United States,
Bankrupt Act of 1867, on the ground that the schedule verified by oath did
not contain a statement of his debt to the plaintiff, and that the latter
had no natice of the proceedings in bankruptey, and did not prove his
claim, it must appear that the omission was fraudulent and the affidavit
willfully false. Symonds v. Barnes, 421.
14. A discharge under the Bdnkruptcy Act cannot be invalidated in a
State court, on the ground of concealment of assets. Parker v. Atwood,
720. 0
BILLS AND NOTES. See CowrOERATE STATES, 1; PARTNERsHIP, 15.
I. Rights and Liabilities of Parties.
1. A holder of a negotiable note bonafide for value, and without notice,
can recover, though he took it under circumstances which ought to have
excited suspicion. Phelan v. Moss, 124.
2. In order to destroy such holder's title it must be shown that he took
it majafide. Id.
3. The maker of an altered note will be liable to a bona fide holder for
value, for the face of the note. Ganard v. Hadden, 125.
4. If one by his acts silence, or negligence, misleads another, he must
bear the loss if the innocent party suffers. Id.
5. It is no defense to a note, against an innocent assignee, that the note
when delivered was left in blank as to the time of payment, and this was
afterward improperly filled in by the payee. Elliott v. Levings, 125.
6. Fraud perpetrated after the execution of a note, is no defense against
an assignee before maturity. Id.
7. Such duress as will constitute a defense to a note must be the menace
of an unlawful imprisonment. K'napp v. Hyde, 125.
8. Where one Scott drew an accommodation note to the order of Slack
and to procure its discount at bank, obtained Kirk's endorsement above
Slack's, if Kirk pays part of the note under threat of a suit, he can recover
from Slack. Slack v. Kirk, 192.
9. Slack is liable to the bank by his endorsement. Id.
10. He could neither set up the Statute of Frauds nor Kirk's want of lia-
bility. Id.
11. Ho could not object to payment to any transferee of the bank, or any
one entitled by substitution to its rights, Id,
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12. Kirk had a right to pay if lie chose, and then to be subrogated. to the
rights of the bank. Id.
13. On paying thtbank Kirk had a right to the note, and could claim as
holder under dlack's lI.uik endorsement. .1d.
14. In a suit on a not-- an aflldavit th.tt the name of the endorser was used
to avoid a defense of usury, but the note was really the property of the
payee, is sufficient. Evans v. t he, 192
15. Insuch a positive afli lavit it is notnecessaryto aver that the defend-
ant can prove tle defense alleged, especially as lie is a competent witness
on the trial. Id.
16. The enlo-.ee of a not3 not en-lorsed until after m-tturity, though
taken before, has no bcttr title than thd endorser. Olark v. Whitaker, 329.
17. Where the payee of a note endorses it after maturity, he cannot set
up usury between himself and thLe maker, as a defense to a suit brought
by the endorsee agatinst the endorser and maker. Frank v. Longstreet, 329.
18. An accommodation draft has no validity until it reaches the hands
of a bon efide holder for value, and if the lirst transfer is taintedwith usu-
ry, it will be void in the hands of any subsequent holder. Howe v. Potter,
459.
19. The mere offer to return the consideration on the ground of there be-
ing misrepresentation, and a demand of the draft, will not make it an ac-
commodation draft nor prevent a bonafldepurchaserfrom recovering the
full amount. Id.
20. Where the first endorser of a negothible note is compelled to pay by
a suit begun before the intervention of the statute of limitations, lie may
recover of the maker in an action for money paid. Godfrey v. Rice, 459.
2L Acceptance admits the genuineness of the drawer's signature, and
entitles a bona fide holder to recover, notwitsttanding the signature is a
forgery. Sal Springs Bank v. Syracuse Savings Inv., 591.
22. The drawee of a forged bill, who has paid it, cannot recover the
money. Id.
23. A cheek on a bank is in substance a bill, and is governed by tho
same rules. Id.
24. The liability of a defendant as the makerofa note must be determined
by the instrument. S.&udivant v. .ull, 529.
IL Form of Bills and Notes.
25. An obligation payable to a certain person "his attorney, executor
administrators or assigns," though called a bond in New York. is held not
to be a specialty but a negotiable instrument, and governed by the rules
applicable to commercial paper. Blake v. Supervisors of Livingston Co., 395.
24. A note of the following tenor, " athaniel 0. Winslow, Cr. By labor
10jY days @ $1.0a prl day, $3 7.0 goot to bearer," is a good negotiable prom-
issory note for -$i7.0. Hussey v. Winslow, 529.
II. Demand and Notice.
27. It is settled law in New York that a bill of exchange drawn it one
State upon a persoi in another is a foreign bill Gemmercial B nk v. rar-
nutm, 407.
2S. At common laxv the rule is thatpresentment anddemaudof payoent
of a foreign bill must be lmade by the notary in person, biit this rule may
be varied by evidne of a nsage universal in tin place where the bill is
payable for the clerk of the notary to mnke such presentmenut and de-
mand. Id.
29. The statute of New York (L. 1,U: eltc. 41G), declaring that days of
grace shall lint attach to bills of exchange. etc., which are "on their face"
payable in "days" after date, or on spei -fled day, does not apply to bills
made payable on their face in months after date. Id.
30. A bill of exchange which is not e',titled to grace, falling due on a
public holiday, is payable on the d.ky followi g. Id.
BOND. See B'LLS and Yo-s 253.
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BOUNDARY.
1. Monuments control courses and distances. Coburn v. Cbzeter, 722.
2. If course and distance ever control monument it is where the deed
shows clearly a mistake in the description of the monument. Id.
BOUNTY. See INFANT, 3.
BROKER.
1. A broker, effecting the sale of a house, may recover his commissions
from his employer, whether lie has the legal title, or-only holds beneflctay,
for another. .Tcnes v. Adler, 5.
2. Where a broker is not to be paid unless he sells at a stipulated price,
such price is a condition precedent to his right to compensation. Id.
3. If a broker introduces the purchaser or discloses his name to the
seller, his right to commissions attaches. Id.
CASES APPROVED, OVERRULED, etc.
Allison v. Chandler, 11 Mich., 52. Approved. Gilbert Yt. Kennedy, 600.
Beltzhoover v. Blackstock, 3 Watts, 20. Criticised. _Phelan v. M'oss, 124.
Bronson v. Rhodes, 7 Wallace, 229. Affirmed. Trebtleock v. Wilson, 151.
Gill v. Cubitt, 3 B & C., 466. Disapproved. -2'Aila v. Moss, 124.
Latimer v. Woodward, 2 Doug., 36. Approved. Hoffman 'v. Harrington,
532.
Manufacturers Bk. v.Penna. Bk,7 W. & S, 335. Approved. .Louchetm ra.
Appeal, 127.
Roosevelt v. Meyer, 1 Wallace, 512. Overruled, Trebicock v. Tilson, 151.
Seitz v. Miles, 16 Mich, 456. Approved. foffvi a v. Hfarrington, 632.
United States v. Rice, 4 Wheat., 247. Explained. United States v. Stark, 37.
United States v. Hayward, 2 Gall., 43G. Explained. United Btates v. StarX,
37.
Wilcox v. Wain, 10 S. & B., 360. Approved. Lou em Ror. Appeal, 127.
CANAL. See IjecuxcoN, 12.
CHARITABLE USE. See Cnmc, 5.
1. Property vested in a religions society, whether incorporated or not, is
a charitable use. Sehnor's Appeal, 262.
2. The society are trustees, and cannot divert the property from the use
to which it was dedicated. Id.
3. If they attempt to divert it equity will raise another trustee. Id.
CHECK. Se6 BILLS AND NOorEs, 23.
CHURCH. See RE ADjUDIcATA, 4,5.
1. A church organized and endowed as belonging to any particular sect
cannot break from that sect. Sahnr's Appeal, 233.
2. In churches, those who submit to the regular order of the church,
though a minority, are the true congreg-ation. Id.
3. The title to the property of a divided congregation is in that part
which is acting in harmony with its own law, and the law which was ac-
cepted before the dispute isthestandard todetermine which is right. Id.
4. Courts will not interfere to compel a person to attend worship at any
place or church. eised v. Afunzenmeer, 776.
5. Where property is conveye- to a church to be used in a certain man.
ner, courts of equity will compel the execution of such trust. Id.
CITIZEN.
1. A person not a citizen of the United States or a temporary resident of
or commorant in the State in which the action Is brought, but a resident
and citizen of the kingdom of Great Britain, may bring an action against
a person not a resident of the State, or having property therein subject to
attachment, for a cause of action not local in its nature, where service of
the process by which the suit is commenced is nrade on the defendant per.
sonally within the State. Peabody v. Hamilton, 311.
2. The fact that a plaintiff is not a resident of a State or personally
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present in it, and is a resident and citizen in the kingdom of Great Britain,
does not disqualify him for bringng a suit therein against a citizen of the
United States, but a non-resident of the State in which the action is
brought and having no property therein subject to attachment. Id.
3. The fact that a defendant is not a resident of a State and has no pro-
perty therein subject to attachment, is not a reason why he cannot be
sued in the State in a transitory action by a plaintiff not a citizen of or
resident in the United States, if only he be personally served with pro-
cess within the State. 1d.
4. It is not necessary that a person should be a resident of a State or of
the United States, or that he should be personally present in a State, in
order that he may be entitled to bring an action against a defendant who
is not a resident of the State and who has no property in it subject to at-
tachment, if only the defendant be found and served with process within
the State. Id.
5. Process for the commencement of a suit may be served on the defen-
dant, a non-resident of the State onboard a foreign vessel at her dock and
before she is moored to it, and such service is gdod even if the defendant
be only transiently within the jurisdiction, on his way from a foreign
country to his residence in another State of the Union. Id.
r. Accordingly, where the defendant, a citizen and resident of New
York, was served with process on board an English steamer, bound from
Liverpool, England, to Boston, at her dock in East Boston (in the waters
of the State of Massachusetts), before she was moored, and while defen-
dant was journeying from Halifax, Nova Scotia, to his home in New York,
said vessel being a 'British mail steamer": Held, that such service was
good and that it gave the court jurisdiction. Id.
7. Where the plaintiff in an action of debt is a non-resident, he will not
be required to pay the tax under the Act of 1870, on the debt before suing
in a court of the State of Georgia. MleDonald v. Flagan, 33U.
8. Citizenship is not forfeited under the Act of March 3, lS55, for deser-
tion, until after conviction. Severance v. Healey, 663.
COIN. See LEGAL TENDER NOTES, 3.
1. Where a note is for dollars, payable by its terms, in specie, the terms
"in specie" are merely descriptive of the kind of dollars in which the note
is payable, there being more than one kind of dollars current recognized
by law; and mean that the designated number of dollars shall be paid in
so many gold or silver dollars of the coinage of the United States. Trebil-
cock v. Wilson, 151.
2. The Act of February 25th, 8 62, in declaring that the notes of the
United States shall be lawful money and a legal tender for all debts, only
applies to debts which are payable in money generally, and not to obliga-
tions payable in commodtties or obligations of any other kind. Id.
3. When a contract for money is, by its terms, made payable in specie
orin coin, judgment may be entered thereon for coined dollars: Bronson
v. Rhodes, 7 Wallace 229. affirmed. Id.
COLLISION. See ADmiRALTY.
COMMON CARRIER. See PASSENGER.
1. Where by specialcontmct a railroad companyis exempted from liabil-
ity for damage to live stock, "except such as may arise from gross negli-
gence or default," the burden of proof of negligence, In case of loss, is
upon the party alleging damage. Bankard v. B. &. 0. R-ilroad Co.. W.
2. Proof of delays and accidents raises no presnuiption of negligence on
the part of the company. ld.
3. When goods in the hands of a common carrier arc threatened to be
destroyed or seized by a public enemy, lie is bound to use due diligence
to prevent it. ilolladay v. Kennard, 126.
4. Whereskill and capacity are required to accomplish an undertaking
it would be negligence not to employpersons havingthe qualifications. Id.
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5. Ordinary negligence is sufficient to ren~der common carrier liable,
without fraud or collusion with the enemy, oif willful negligence. Id.
6. The obligations and liabilities of a common carrier are not dependent
upon contract; they are imposed by the law. Hannibal Railroad v. Stwift,
12.
7. If a common carrier has reasonable grounds for refusing to receive
persons and their baggage, he is bound to insist at the time upon such
grounds, in order to avoid responsibility. Id.1
8. The liability of a carrier attaches when the property passes with his
assent into his possession. Id.
9. A railroad company r6ceiving in cars accompanying its passenger
trains, property of a passenger other than his' baggage, when no fraud or
concealment is practiced upon its employees, is liable for the same. Id.
10. Surigical instruments in the case of a surgeon in the army traveling
with troops constitute part of his baggage. Id.
11. A common carrier will not be liable for the loss of goods occurring
beyond the termination of his route, where the receipt contains an ex-
press agreement that that company should be held answerable for the
goods, in whose actual custody they were when a loss happens. Bickets
v. B. & 0. R. -. Co., 192.
I The owner of a tug-boat engaged in towing is not a common carrier.
Hayes v. .Ittler, 370.
13. Therefore, in an action against such owner for negligence of his ser-
vants by which the tow was injured, the plaintiff has the burden of proof
of negligence. Id.
14. Plaintiff having given evidence of neghence, defendant cannot re-
but It by proving the general good character and skill of his servahts.
d.
15. A master is liable for thd negligence of his servants in the course of
their employment without regard to their character for care and skill.
Id.
16. Where a railroad company receipts for goods to be transported be-
yond its terminus it will be liable for the default of the other carriers on
the line. .ing v. .Macon and WVestern RB., 720.
COMMONWEALTH.
Tnx ANeCIENT COMfONwEALTn. 425.
CONFEDERATE STATES. See AENT 19; CUSTOMS, 1.
1. Althougn commercial intercourse between the States in insurrection,
and those in occupation of the United States during the late war was un-
lawful, and therefore a bill of exchange drawn in Mississippi on a person
in New Orleans while the latter was under control of the Federal army
was void, yet a capture of such bill by the United States commander did
not authorize him to collect and confiscate the' money in the hands of the
drawee in New Orleans. Britlon v. Butler, 293.
2. Whether money voluntarily paid by the drawee under such circum-
stances can be recovered back, not decided. Id.
3. An action of assumpsit to recover money so seized, not within the
statute of March 3d, 1863, limiting actions for arrests or imprisonments
under color of authority of the United States, to two years. rd.
4. During the late war, cotton was treated by both belligerents as quasi
contraband of war. and liable to seizure or destruction. Ford v. Surget,
301.
5. Acts done by the military authorities of the Confederate States, with.
in the legitimate sphere of war, do not render the doers liable to private
parties whose property may have been injured thereby. Id.
6. Defendant, under the order of a Confederate provost-marshal, burned
plaintiff's cotton, both parties being at the timo within the lines of a Con-
federate military district and subject to the Confederate authority: leld,
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that defendant was not liable for the loss to plaintiff. Id.
CONSPIRACY. See AcTiox 2.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
I. Power of the Executive.
1. Underthe Constitution of Georgiatlie Governor may exercise the par.
doning power before as well as after conviction. Dominick v. .Bowdoin,
334.
IL Power of Legislature. See OFFICE AND OFFIcEa, 2.
2. LEGISLATIVE POWER TO AMEND CUARTERs, 1.
9. The Acts of Assembly of Maryland providing that tile Baltimore and
Ohio railroads shall pay one-fifth of the fares received for the transporta-
tion of passengers over its road between Washington and Baltimore, into
the State Treasury, for tile use of the State, are constitutional, and free
from the objection of being capitation taxes. State of M3faryland v. B. &
0. B. AV., 54.
4. Even if such one-fifth of the farewas a capitation tax, and unconstitu-
tional, the company having collected It could not retain it as against the
State, and assumpsit for money had and received would lie by the State,
to recover it. Id.
5. The legislature of a State may compel a municipal corporation to con-
struct highways, or other improvements for public purposes, without the
consent of the corporate authorities, or a vote of the citizens. The People
v. Flagg, 8.
6. So it may direct the corporation to levy a tax or to issue its bonds to
pay for such improvement. Id.
7. The provision of the Constitution of the State of New York, art 7, § 12,
prohibiting the contracting any debt by or in behalf of the State, unless
such debt be authorized by a law submitted to the people, does not apply
to the debts of cities or other subordinate municipal corporations, but to
those of the State itself. Id.
. A tax of "so much per ton of the registered tonnage" of vessels owned
by the citizens of a State, is within the prohibition of the Constitution
that, "no State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of
tonnage." Cbzv. The collector, 126.
9. The Act of 9th March, 185, incorporating the"Greenand Barren River
Company," and leasing to the said company the river line of navigation,
with all the franchises and appurtenances. together with the right to take
tolls, etc., is not in violation of the provision of the National Constitution,
forbidding any State without the consent of Congress, to levyany duty of
tonnage. Beynoldsv.&mallhouse, 164.
10. Nor Is the act in violation of that clause of the Constitution of the
United States, which gives Congress the power "to regulate commerce
with foreign nations and among the several States. Id.
11. The 37th section of article 2d of the State Constitution was adopted
to prevent amendments to legislative enactments, by which distinct and
wnconnected matters mizlt be introduced in tie same law, and is not tobe
construed as applying to a Case, where all the provisions of a statute re-
late, directly or indirectly, to tile same subject, and are not foreign to the
subject embraced in the title. ld.
12. The State Legislature having entire control of the funds arising from
the collection of tolls on tile river line of navigation, could appropriate
them to repairing the locks or dams, in preference to placing them to the
credit of the sinking fund; and when the cost greatly exceeded the reve-
nue derived from such navigation, It was authorized to lease the right to
take the tolls, without violating the provision of tile State Constitution.
declaringthat tile General Assembly should lave no power topass laws to
diminish the revenues of the sinking fand." Id.
13. It is settled in Ohio that independent of a constitutional prohibition,
It is within tile legitnatc scope of legislative power to authorize a mu-
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nicipality to aid in the construction of a public improvement such as a
railroad, by becoming a stockholder in a corporationcreated for that pur-
pose, and to levy taxes to pay the subscription. Walker v. City of Clncin-
nati, 346.
14. The public or corporate interest in ail improvement rather than its
particular location, determines the question as to the right of taxation
for its construction; and therefore the fact thatthe improvement contem-
plated will lie mainly outside of the State, can make no difference. Id.
15. The Constitution of Ohio provides that "The General Assembly shall
never authorize any county, city, town, or township, byvoteofits citizens
orotherwise, to become a stockholder in any joint stock company, corpora-
tion or association whatever; or to raise money or loan its credit to, or in aid
of, any such company, corporation or association." An Act of 1869 pro.
vided that certain cities should be authorized to construct a line of rail-
road leading therefrom to any other terminus In this Staterrin any other
State through the agency of a board of trustees consisting of five persons,
to be appointed by the Superior Court of such city, provided that a ma-
jority of the City Council should, by resolution, have declared such line of
railway to be essential to the interest of the city, and the said railway
should have received the sanction of a majority vote of the electors of the
city, at a special election ordered by the City Council, after twenty days,
public notice: Held, that thisactis constitutional. Id.
1Il. Trial by Jury.
16. The extension of trials of replevin to justices, does not violate the
provision of the Constitution providing "that trial by jury shall remain
inviolate forever," though a justice's jury is only composed of six men.
.Knight v. Campbell, 591.
17 The Constitution in guaranteeing "trial by jury as it has been here-
tofore used," Intended to embrace juries in justices' courts. Id.
18. The word "jury," as used in the Constitution, does not mean a jury
of twelve, exclusively. Id.
iv. Judicial Power.
19. TaE PowEr oF THRE JUDICIARY TO DEcLARE A L.&w UxCONSTITUTIONAL,
729.
V. Taking _Pivale Property.
20. An act of the legislature authorizing private property to be taken
for a public school-house site is not in conflict with the provision of the
Constitution which prohibits the taking of private property except for
public use. In this case the use, though local, is public. School .Board v.
Hackmon, 527.
Z1. The legislature can empower a railroad corporation to cross a turn-
pike road, on making compensation, without impairing a contract within
the meaning of th Constitution. Turnpike _a v. Union R. R., 580.
22. Where the legislature authorizes a railroad company to construct a
road, upon paying damages to land owners, andl in building the road a cut
is made through an embankment, whereby the river flows in and deposits
gravel and stones on the land of one who does not own the embankment,
such flowage is a taking within the Constitution, and if the legislature in-
tended it without compensation to the owner Of the land, it is unconstitu-
tional. Eaton v. Boston, Cbncord 6c Montreal B. .B., 720.
CONTRACT. See AGREFXENT; ATTORNEY, 3; Lrx Looe, 12.
1. After a simple contract is broken and damages accrued, it cannot be
discharged by parol without satisfaction, or some consideration. Cutler
v. Bobbins, 55.
2. Ordinarily, the payment of moneyis not necessaryto make a contract
complete. Orr's Appeal, 193.
3. Where a contract is void on the ground of public policy, or being
against a statute, its confirmation is affected with the original taint.
Bi'egley v. Lindsay, 139.
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4. CA contract void on account of fraud may be confirmed wIthoutanew
consideration. Id.
5. A party knowingly confirming a contract against conscience, is barred
from relief. .d.
6. A contract by the children to release all their right to their father's
land to one, in consideration of his supportinghim for life, is not contrary
to public policy. Wall:er v. Walker, 196.
7. Though two of the children were married women, who did not
acknowledge the deed as such, it was binding on the others. Id.
8. Though it was not a legal conveyance, it would be supported after the
father's death in equity as an estoppel. ld.
9. When it is averred in a petition, that a contract susceptible of two
meanings, was intended to have a particular one, it will be so -construed
on an issue joined by demurrer. Craft v. Bent, 329.
10. A decreerequiring theperformance of a contract byoneparty, should
also require performance by the other, if possible. Id.
11. Courts will never presume a contract to be illegal. d.
12. When there is a written contract between the parties the court is to
construe it. Colebrook v. Merrill, 335.
13. A written contract, unsealed, to take "1 fifty per cent.in full of amount
due," given by a creditor to his debtor, possesses no mutuality, and is no
defense to a suit for the entire demand. Webb v. Stewart, 529.
14. A contract to pay a certaiu sum for aid in procuring a marriage is
void, and no damages can be recovered for its breach. Crawfordv.Russell,
592.
15. Where one enters into a contract to perform services, part of which
are illegal, he cannot recover in assumpsit upon a quantum meruit for any
portion. Bixey v. Moor, 721.
16. A contract to pay money for the exercise of influence in procuring a
pardon is void as against public policy. Express Co. v. Reno, 750.
17. The law will not lend its aid to carry into effect a contract which is
contrary to sound public policy, but will leave the parties as itflndsthem,
in pari delitto. Id.
18. But this doctrine has no application to executory contracts. In all
such cases the parties can avail themselves of the locuspenitentis, rescind
the contract, and recover back any money or property advanced under it.
ed.
19. A contract to prosecute a claim against the United States for twenty
per cent. of the amount, is contrary to the Act of Congress to prevent
frauds on the treasury, and therefore void. Zones v. Blacldidge, 773.
CORPORATION.
1. A stockholder cannot maintain an action to effect a forfeiture of the
charter for non-user within a year. Gelman v. Green Point Sugar Co., 194.
2. A lease by one company to another, the necessary effect of which is to
suspend the business of the lessor for more than one year, is invalid
against the stockholders not consenting. Copeland v. Cilizens' Gas Light
Co., 194.
3. Anactlon to set aside such lease may be brought byastockholderwho
has not consented to it. Id.
4. The managing agents of a corporation are liable in an action of tort
for injuries resulting from the negligence of the corporation it the use of
a steam-boiler. Loseev..Buchanan, 194.
5. A corporation cannot escape liability for injuries, because they hap-
pened at a time when its sub-agent, employed to conduct its affairs, was
in charge. d.
6. A president of a corporation cannot bring a suit in his own name, on
an agreement signed by him as president, entered into on behalf of the
corporation. 2Ewhols v. Williams, 265.
7. Where the by-laws of a corporation provide that the officers shall re.
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ceive such compensation for services as the directors shall fix, the secre-
tary, who has rendered services, will be entitled to compensation, when
none has been fixed. Missouri River Railroad v. Richards, 3-28
8. Avoluntary society, incorporated. may be compelled by mandamus
to restore a member unjustly expelled. People ex. rel. Koehler v. Mtfeehan-
its' Aid oc., 460.
9. Where theConstitution makes "slander against the society" a ground
for expulsion, it will be presumed that the common law offense of slander
is intended. Id.
10. A legislative grant to a corporation sanctions only such implied
powers as are necessarily incident to those expressly bestowed. Turnpike
Rd. v. Union R. R., 530.
11. A member of a corporation not its financial officer, cannot make
himself its creditor by the voluntary payment of its debts. .Blanchard v.
Association of Spiritualists, 530.
12. Claims of a portion of the trustees of a corporation are not within
the meaning of the Act of 1848, of New York, making the trustees of a
manufacturing company liable for its debts in certain cases. -Briggs v.
Fasterly, 660.
COSTS. See TRUST AND TRUSTEE, 6.
COURTS. See CITIZEN, 1-6: CaxIIAL LAw, 8.
1. In the adjudication of cases under the Captured or Abandoned Pro-
perty Act, the Court of Claims is a court, not a mere commission, and has
jurisdiction to render judgment against the United States for specific
amounts, which cannot be reviewed by the executive officers of the gov-
ernment. Brown v. United States, 172.
2. A claimant under the above-named Act obtained a decree of.the
Court of Claims in his favor for a certain sum, afterward the Secretary
of the Treasury reduced the amount, and paying part, refused to pay the
balance-whereupon claimant brought suit against the United States for
the balance: Held, that he might recover. Id.
3. Actions against the government and public officers, discussed by
NoTT, J. Id.
4. A court having no clerk or recording officer isnot a "court of record"
within the meaning of the United States statute of April 14th, 1802, and
has no jurisdiction in naturalization. &ate v. Whittemore, 268.
5. The passing of counterfeit treasury notes may be an offense against
the United States and also against an individual State. United States v.
Wells, 424.
6. In such case there would be concurrent! jurisdiction in the Federal
and State courts to take cognizance of the offense, and the judgment of
one would not be pleadable, either in abatement or in bar of an indict-
ment in the other. Id.
7. But the rule of comity between courts of concurrent jurisdiction,
that the one first acquiring jurisdiction of the case will not be interfered
with during the pendency of the proceedings, applies to criminal as well
as civil actions. Id.
8. Therefore, where a United States marshal charged with the arrest of
a counterfeiter found him in the custody of a State sheriff on an indict-
ment for the same offense, his duty was to make return of that fact and
leave the prisoner in the sheriff's custody: btIt the marshal having taken
the prisoner out of the sheriff's hand, and the prisoner on indictment in
the Federal court having pleaded the proceedings of the State court in
abatement, the Federal court sustained the indictment but remanded the
prisoner to the custody of the State authorities. Id.
9. The Circuit Courts of the United States have no jurisdiction of an
action in which a State is plaintiff. Misconsin v. Duluth, 709.
10. By the Constitution of the United States the Supreme Court has
original jurisdiction in such cases, and no concurrent jurisdiction has
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been conferred by Congress on the Circuit Courts. Id.
1. Whether Congress could confer a concurrent jurisdiction in such
cases on the Cireuit Court: Qucure. Id.
COVENANT. See VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 6.
CRIINAL LAW. See CouNTs, 5-8; HABEAS CORPUS, 4,5.
L. In general.
1. It is sufficient in indictments that the charge be stated with sufficient
certainty for the defendant to know what he is called to answer. cbm-
monwealth v. Keenln, 19S.
2. The grand jury may ignore a count, but cannot find less than the
whole of any count. Id.
3. A petit jury miy impose costs on a defendant under a defective indict-
ment. Id
4. Courts refuse to quash where the indictment is for a serious offense,
but compel a demurrer, a motion in arrest of judgment orawrit of error.
Id.
5. Thoughajury may find a party indicted for one offense, guilty of a
minor one Included in it, a magistrate cannot. State v. Runels, 329.
6. The charge as mide in the complaint determines the power of the
magistrate to try or only bind over.- Id.
7. Where amagistrate cannot convict, he has no power to acquit. Id.
8. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire has original concurrent juris.
diction in all criminal cases where a magistrate has. Id,
9. Where a complaint before a police court describes an offense, the
maximum punishment of which is greater than the court has po wer to im-
pose it must be dismissed. State v. Dolby, 330.
10. ARE JURIES JUDGES OF THE LAW AS WELL AS OF THE FACTS IN CR1ax.
WAX, CASES? 401.
11. A defendant on trial for an intent to commit a rape, having made a
statement under the statute, that "all the allegations of the prosecution
are false and untrue, and that he had never insulted her in his life," it is
error for the court to charge the jury that "the statement of defendant
does not, howeve; directly deny the assault. This silence would go far to
confirm the testimony of the plaintiff." His assertion that "al her alle-
gations "-of which the assault was one-were false and untrue, was a
direct denial of the assault. Defoe v. People, 525.
12. The "statement" of a defendant, on trial for a criminal offense, when
he chooses to make one, may be considered by the jury, in view of all the
circumstances which may affect its credit; nor can he claim any protec-
tion from the effect of significant omissions, on the ground that he is not
required to criminate himself. Id.
13. In the trial of a married woman on an indictment for selling liquor,
her failing to testify in her own behalf may be considered by the jury.
State of .Maine v.'Cleaves, 531.
14. A married woman selling liquor in the presence of her husband, con-
trary to law, is presumed to act under his coercion, but this may be
rebutted. Id.
15. A request to depart from defendant's land and a refusal is necessary
before defendant canjustity a resort to force. State v. Woodward, 721.
16. A purchaser of liquor sold in violation of law is guilty of nocrihinal
offensc and must testify. Stale v. Raid, 721.
17. Under indictment for selling spirituous liquors, evidence of selling
ale, porter and cider, is not admissible. Id.
I. Murder.
18. 3furder committed in perpetrating a robbery is murder of the first
degree, although not committed with a deliberate and premeditated do-
sign to kill. Stale v. Pike, 233.
19. Under an indictment, alleging that the accused "feloniously, will.
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fully, and of his malice aforethought, did kill and murder," the jury may
return a verdict of "guilty of murder in the first degree" upon proof of
murder by deliberate and premeditated killing. Id.
20. Under such an indictment, the Jury may return a verdict of 't guilty
of murder in the first degree" upon proof of murder committed in perpe&
trating robbery. Id.
21. A charge that, if the defendant killed his wife in amanner that would
be criminal if he were sane, the verdict should be not guilty by reason of
Insanity, if the killing was the result of menial disease, is correct. State
v. Tones, 662.
22. Whether the defendant had a mental disease, and whether the killing
of his wife was the result of such disease, are questions of fact for the
jury. _Id.
23. Whether every insane impulse to kill is irresistible Is a question of
fact. Id.
IL Larceny.
24. Upon a trial for larceny of a horse a bill of sale offered by the pris-
oner, without showing its bonafide execution is inadmissible as evidence
Taylor v. The State, 330.
IV. Fa se Pretenses.
25. To sustain au indictment for false pretenses the pretenses alleged to
be false must be of some existing fact and made for the purpose of influ-
encing the purchaser. &,ott v..People, 660.
26. Both the Inducement and the fraudulent purpose are facts to be
proved, not presumed. Id.
V. .Perjury.
27. False swearing in an application for naturalization in a State court,
Is indictable as perjury under the State law. Stale v. Whittemore, 263.
28. An indictment for perjury committed on the trial of a cause, should
contain as essential: 1. The name of the court. 2. The offense should be
charged as committed in the county in which the indictment was found;
and S. It should appear that the evidence on which the assignment is
based, was material to the issue. Guston v. People, 263.
29. An indictment alleging that the action was pending in the "Supreme
Court of the City of New York," and that the! referee who administered
the oath was appointed by the Supreme Court of the City and County of
New York is faulty in matter of substance. .I.
VI. .brci le Bntry and Detainer.
30. On the trial of a forcible entry, evidence of force employed to main.
tain a possession peaceably obtained is inadmissible. Hoffman v. Earring-
ton, 532.
31. Every forcible entry is forbidden, but not a forcible detainer after a
peaceable entry, unless the detainer is unlawful. Id.
CURTESY. See HusaDn .&D Wn, 2.
CUSTOMS.
1. The Confederate States never had any existence as a sovereign power.
All the laws of the United States were in force at all times and in all places
within the territory of the United States during the war, whether the
places were within the military lines of the Confederate forces or not.
United Stales v. Stark, 37.
2. The concession of belligerent rights did not recognize or confer any
right on the Confederate States to collect duties on imports at a port
within their lines. Id.
3. Therefore payment to a Confederate collector of the part of Savan.
nah, of duties on gods which ran the blockade, is no defense to an
action by the United States for the duties under the revenue laws. Al.
4. The principles of the decisions in U7. . v. Hayward, 2 Gall. 486, and ..
v. Rice, 4 Wheat. 247, do not apply to such a case. Those were cases where
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the territory passed under the sovereignty of a foreign power during a
public war. Id.
DAM See WATEn AND WVATERCOURSES, 3.
The Mill-dam Act of Kansas is constitutional and valid. Venard v. Cross,
334.
DAMAGES. See BAILMEiT, 4; nE V0R AN PURCH&SER, 5, 20.
L The measure of damages in an action brought to recover the value of
certain U. S bonds, payable in gold, deposited with a banker and never
returned, is the value of the bonds at the time of demand, and t It value
of the gold interest from the day the same was payable, with intereit on
the value of the several instthlents of such gold interest, due semi-an-
nually. .aury V. Umyle, 52.
2. Where there is neither fraud, malice, gross negligence, nor oppression,
damages will be confined to compensation for the injury. Belknap v. Bos-
ton & .Maine Railroad, 53.
3. Where exemplary or punitory damages are to be given, the con-
dition and circumstances of the defendant may be material, but otherwise
not. Id.
4. Excessive damages are a ground for setting aside a verdict. Id.
5. So where the damages are too small. Id.
6. A town, liable for damages from insufficiency of a highway, is not
entitled to have the amount received by the plaintifr from an insurance
company, deducted from the amount of Its liability. Harding v. Town of
Townshend, 128.
7. The conduct and words of a defendant after suit brought, is not an
element of damages in an action of slander. Sliizer v. Reynolds, 133.
8. Instruction to the jury that "If the contract was broken by the de-
fendants, the plaintiff is entitled to be put in the same position, pecunia-
rily, as he would have been, if the contract had been kept, regard being
had to the fact that plaintiff soon after obtained other employment :" Held
correct. Garsed v. Turner, 259.
9. In an action of slander where no special damage is alleged, the jury
may give general damages for whatever is the necessary and natural re-
sult of the words spoken. Miles v. Barringon, 330
10. In slander, for words per se actionable, damage is presumed without
proof of actual damage. Id.
11. In such action the jury are to decide if exemplary damages are to be
given. Id.
12. An agreement that if either party to a contract failed to perform his
part, be should forfeit $1,0 t, is a penalty and not liquidated damages.
Zee, Wylly& o. v. Overslreet, 395.
13 The measure of damages for one who being deprived of pasturage for
his cattle, pastures them on his meadow, is what was the value of tie mea-
dow-land as meadow. Gilbert v. Kennedy, 600.
14. The measure of damages for the non-payment of money, or the non-
delivery of a debtor's obligations for money, is the amount due and inter-
est, and as an almost universal rule no collateral damages can be given.
Cidy of Memphis v. Brown, 629.,
15. If negotiable boads of a class which, by the usages of trade, are vendi-
ble in market at established rates, are to be Issued in payment, accompanied
with a sinking fund to give them greater market value, such bonds are to
be treated as if they were chattels and things in esse, and the damages for
failure to provide the fund will be the difference between the value of the
bonds as they were agreed to be made, and the value as they were in fact
made. Id.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See CoRPoRATIoN, 11.
L Generally.
I. Where a constable purchases a chattel sold by himselt under an exe-
51
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cution, and then sells to a bonafide vendee, having accounted for the price
to the execution creditor, neither the constable nor his vendee will be
chargeable as trustees for another creditor. 1hrnum v. Perry. 133.
2. The half-pay of a government officer is not liable to be taken by his
creditors. iwysn's Appeal, 195.
3. The pay having reached the beneficiary [a lunatic], and being in his
committee's hands, is to be distributable by direction oflaw. Id.
4. His future pay could not be assigned by him, if sane, nor intercepted
by his creditors. Id.
5. Where the question is whether promissory notes were given in pay-
ment of a debt or as a loan,-and there is evidence of payment being made
to the party, claiming that it was for a debt, as owner and holder, the jury
should say what weight that ought to have. -ish v. Dar, 664.
6. Where there is evidence that the notes were given in payment of
goods purchased, the judge should not direct a verdict for plaintil, in an
action to recover the amount paid as being a loan. Id.
11. VoidAssigninents.
7. Where a number of execution creditors agree to give the debtor time,
they are bound in good faith to carry it out among themselves. Loucheim-
.Bros.' Appeal, 127.
& A debtor owed one of his creditors $1,600, but stated it In an agree-
ment and to the other creditors at $30, and in order to induce his credi-
tor to sign gave him a judgment of $0, payable in thirty (lays; this was a
fraud on the others, and as to them void. Id. '
9. It was not void as to creditors not signing. Id.
10. The creditor having issued execution on his Judgment for M260, was a
trustee ez mnaefilo for the signers in respect to any advantage obtained
by it. Id.
1U. Where one of the assignors in an assignment for the benefit of cuedL
tors is an infant only nineteen, theassignment is void as against creditors.
Yates v. Lyon, M3O.
12. Nor does it matter that the infant, afterward, by his silence.consent-
ed to and ratified it. Id.
IL Sale or Conveance fraudulent as to COeditor. See anteS.
13. Where a debtor has transferred his property to his wife, who holds it
for his use and permits him to control It, it will not protect him in a court
of equity, that the forms of law have been pursued. Metropolitan Bk. v.
.Durant et al, 56.
14. No payment of consideration will protect a sale contrived to defraud
creditors, where the purchaser has knowledge of the obJec ,ofthe sale. Id.
15. A subsequent attaching creditor cannot maintain audtla querela
against a prior one, on the ground that the debtor was non-resident, anI
the judgment was obtained without notice. EssezMning Co.v. Ballard, 196.
16. Nor can he maintain such suit on the ground that the judgment was
fraudulent as to creditors, for if so the property may be pursued in disze.
gard of the prior attachment. I.
17. It is not sufficient to set aside a deed made by a grantor in failing
circumstances, that his object was fraudulent, it must be shown that the
grantee participated in the intent or had knowledge of the object. Mer-
chants' k. of Newton v. Northrup, 264.
18. The mere fact that the grantee heard of the grantor's suspension or
failure is not enough. 1d.
19. A purchaser in good faith, without notice, of goods sold with the in-
tent to defraud creditors obtains a good title. Diefendorfv. Oliver, 395.
20. If the purchaser pays by giving his negotiable notes to a third party,
he cannot be garnisheed by the creditors of the vendor. Id.
21. The claimant of a decedent's property under a transfer invalid as
against creditors, is not affected by the decree of a Probate Court eharg
Ing the administrator with it. Cross v. Bro u, 721.
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I. A sale and conveyance by an executor under an order of the Orphans'
Court for thu payment of debts nf a testator, does not dlscharge the land
from the lien of ujudgment against the heir or devisee. BockLover v. Ayres,
2614.
2. The judgment creditor has no right therefore to any part of the pur-
chase-noney. Id
3. The question as to whether the lands of a decedent are liable for the
payment of debts or legacies is within the jurisdiction ofthe Courtof Pro-
bate of New Hampshire, and its decision is conclusive untilappealedfrom
Hare v. Woodayn 327.
4. All claims against a solvent estate are barred In three years from the
granting of administration unle.s suit is begun. Id.
5. A child born after the making of a will cannot recover any portion of
an advancement m:nde to a brother or sister before the will was made.
Sanford v. Sanford, 45q.
6. Conveyances to children without consideration wilt be deemed ad-
vancements. Id.
7. Small sums given to spend or defray traveling expenses will not be
considered as advancements; otherwise as to sums given to start a son in
business. Id.
8. An order of a Court of Probate directing the estate of an intestate to
be disrributed to the persons whom such court finds to be the heirs at
law and entitled to the estate, is conclusive, and furnishes full protection
to the administrator until set aside on appeal. Kellogg v. Tohnson, 746.
9. No relief can be had, even in equity, by the next of kin against the
sureties on the administrator's bond. Dorshimer v. Rorbacc 773.
10. The next of kin may maintain a suit in equity for his distributive
share. Id.
11. Ordinarily a legatee or next of kin must sue the executer or admin-
istrator only, and cannot join debtors of the estate, but where there is col-
lusion between them and the executor he may. Id.
DEED.
1. A grantee must show that an alteration beneficial to himself was
properly made. iobinson v. Mers, 196.
2. If the alteration appears to be made with the same pen and ink, the
inference is that it was made before sealing and delivering, otherwise evi.
dence is required to explain it. Id.
3. The law does not presume an interlineation in a deed a forgery, or
made after execution. Id.
4. A plot referred to in a deed is as much apart of the deed as if incor-
porated In it. Id.
5. Nothing less than thirty years' possession in conformity with a deed
Is sufficient to raise the presumption of its authenticity. Walker v
Wal er, 196.
6. W here proof of possession cannot be had, the deed may be read, if its
genuineness is otherwise satisfactorily established. Id.
7. Where a deed of a husband and wife is set aside on account of the
husband's unsoundness of mind, no deduction will be made for the value
of the wife's right or dower, nor for taxes paid since the execution of the
deed. Marvin v. Lewis, 261.
S. Such deed proves nothing, and the wife could not convey her inchoate
right of dower. Id.
9. A deed being void the heir of the grantor may recover the land with.
out any deductions. 1d.
10. A subsequent grantee cannot attack a prior deed of his grantor for
fraud or want of consideration. Gray v. Ulric el al, 331.
11. Unless he has the equitable title at the time of the execution of the
prior deed. I
796 INDEX.
DEED.
12. A deed describing land by the subdivision and number of the sec-
tion, and number of the township and range, is not void for uncertainty,
though the county and State be omitted. BusseZl v. Sweezei, 460.
DESERTER.
A deserter is not disfranchised under the Act of March 3d, 1865, until af-
ter conviction by court martial. Leverance v. -ealey, 331.
DIVORCE. See HUSBAND ARD WIPE, L
DOLLARS. See Corn, 1.
DOWER. See HUSBAND AwD WroI, Ul.
DURESS. See BIs AND NOTEs, 7. -
EASEMENT. See ALLEY; ESToPL, 4.
1. A land owner, who in the reasonable use of his own land diverts or ob-
structs the flow of water not gathered into a stream, but either circulating
through the pores of the earth, or spreading over the surface in the season
of melting snows or heavy rains, is not liable for an injury to his nieighbor
caused by such diversion or obstruction. Sweet v. Chits, 11.
2. Where the plaintiffand defendant were adjoining owners of land by
the side of a highway, in the ditch of which water was accustomed to ac-
cumulate, and for many years it found its way off through a depression in
defendant's land: Held, that plaintiff would acquire no right by prescrip.
tion to have the water run off over the defendant's land. Id.
3. The owner of two adjoininglots, which mayb e designated as the east
and west lots, leased the former for the renewable term of ninety-nine
years, at a certain yearly rent, and in the lease coTenanted that the lessee
should have the right and privilege to make openings and place lights in.
the wall which he contemplated erecting on the western line of the pro.
perty leased. The wall was erected and openings were made and lights
placed therein, which overlooked the west lot. Subsequently the lessor
conveyed the reversion in the east lot and premises to the lessee thereof,
in fee, and by this deed were granted with the lot all buildings and im-
provements thereon erected, "and all and every the rights, alleys, ways,
waters, privileges, appurtenances, and advantages to the aame belonging, or
in anywise appertaining." Afterward the owner of the west lot conveyed
the same, in fee, to a third party, the deed containing a covenant of
special warranty. On an action brought by the vendee of the west lot
against the vendor for an alleged breach of the covenant of special war-
ranty, it was Held:
1st. That the conveyance to the vendee of the east lot, passed the full
right to the free use and enjoyment of the lights in the wall as they then
existed, as an incident and appurtenance to the land conveyed; and that
such right as appurtenantto the premises will pass therewith to all succes-
sive owners of the property.
2d. That the vendee of the west lot took it with the servitude annexed
for the benefit of the east lot, and the existence of this servitude, and the
enjoyment thereof by the owner of the east lot, constituted no breach of
the covenant of special warranty. Janes v. Jrencins, 24.
4. Whenever an owner has created and annexed peculiar qualities and
incidents to different parts of his estate (and it matters not whether it be
done by himself or his tenant by his authority), so that one portion of his
land becomes visibly dependent upon another for the supply or escape of
water, or the supply of light and air, or for means of access, or for bene-
ficial use and occupation, and he grants the part to which such incidents
are annexed, those incidents thus plainly attached to the part granted,
and to which another part be made servient, will pass to the grantee as
accessorial to the beneficial use and enjoyment of the land. Id.-
5. The owner of land can have no easement in or over his adjoining
lands, and where he sells one parcel, the right to enjoy privileges and con.
veniences, which he, when owner of both, enjoyed in the other, does not
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pass to the purchaser. Slanforcv. .Lyon anfwife, 127.
6. An agreement by tenant for years to abandon an easement cannot
bind the reversioner. Glenn v. Davis, 531.
7. A conveyance of a strip of land in express terms, with restrictions
that it is to be used only as a road, Is a grant of the fee and not of a mere
casement. Coburn v. Coxeter, 722.
EJECTMIENT. See EQUITY, 12.
,Ejectment, and not a bill in equity, is the appropriate remedy for the
trial of a title, where the complainant is out of possession, and the
title is not clear and beyond suspicion. Jf2offan v. Beard, 593.
ENTRY. See REAL ESTATE.
1. If the tenant In a writ of entry disclaims, he is held to admit the de-
mandant's title to the part disclaimed, and is estopped from denying.
Wells v. Jackson Iron Co., 663.
2. The disclaimer may be amended before judgment to cover a greater
or lesser amount. Id.
EQUITY. See DECEDENT'S ESTATE. 9,10. EJECTXENT; INJUNOCTON.
1. To correct deeds for fraud or mistake Is an ancient and well-estab-
li-ied head of equity jurisdiction. Lossv. Oby,57
2. Mistakes are corrected even when they exist in the records of courts.
ld.
3. The writ of assistance can only issue against persons who are parties
to the suit, and in all cases the parties against whom the writ is applied
for should have notice of the application, and are entitled to be heard.
Blauvelt v. Si&nWh, 57.
4. In equity all suits must be in the name of the party really interested.
.chiwols v. Milliams, 265.
5. The complainant is inadmissible as a witness when the answer is by
a party In a representative capacity. Sweet v. Parker, 265.
6. Where the bill prays an answer without oath, if sworn to it will not
be so treated. Id.
7. Many exceptions exist to the rule that in equity all must be parties
who have an interest in the object of the suit. Id,
8. Where the trustees of a fund belonging to parents for life, remainder
to the children, together with the parents are made parties defendant to
a suit affecting the fund, it is no objectionthat thechildren are not joined.
yd.
9. Courts or equity have no general supervisory power over the govern-
ment of municipal corporations. Phelps v. Oity of Wralerlown, 398.
10. Courts of equity will not interfere between an individual citizen
and municipal authority unless for an injury falling under a recognized
head of equity. .d.
11. A tax-payer filing a bill to restrain the city from prosecuting a con-
tract for improving the streeti, and not atleging that his premises are
interfered with, or that taxes had been levied to pay the contractors, is
not entitled to relief. IM.
12. A hilt to quiet title, filed by one not shown to be In possession against
one who is, and nothing appearing to prevent proceedings at law, cannot
be maintained. Barrow v. Robbins, 532.
13. A bill in equity maybe malntainCol to redeem a pledge if an account
is wanted, or If the pledge has been assigned. While Arountain R. R. v
Bay Stlate Iron Co., 660.
14. The pledgors of bonds secured by mortgage may redeem after fifteen
ysrs, notwithstanding the norigage lhas beeni foreclosed. M.
15. Upon. affidavit of the complainant, in a proceeding in equity, that
the defendant conceals his property so that no attachment or levy there-
of can be made, and that there is good reason to believe that be is about
to leave the State to avoid the payment of his debts, and sufficient evi-
dence In support thereof, any justice of the Supreme Judicial Court, In
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vacation, is empowered to issue an order requiring the arrest of the de-
fendant, or an attachment of his goods or estate, as security for the
enforcement of the final decree of the court in the proceeding in aid of
which such order is issued. ,Somuel v. Wiley, 755.
16. Independent of statute authority, and mder the powers essentially
incident to the obtaining security for the performance of its decrees, a
court of equity, or a justice thereof, in vacation, may by writ of capias
order the arrest of a party intending to leave the State in order to avoid
such decrees, in a case where the complainant ias not a legal remedy and
cannot hold the defendant to bail. Id.
17. The authorityandpraceice in such casesareanalogousto the authori
ty and practice pertaining to the writ of ne areal regno, as recognized and
administered by the English law. Id.
18. A court of equity will not enforce an executory contract when thq
consideration is founded on fraud. Ownes v. Ownes, 776.
19. Courts of equity have recognized and established this distinction
between conveyances and executory contracts. When the title is vested,
they never avoid it for want of consideration; and, on the other hand.
they never enforce an executory contract without consideration. They
treat it as nullity. Id.
ERRORS AND APPEALS. See CanimAL LAw, U; EVIDWoFx, 7; PA aDOI, 1;
PA]Tmasn p, 14.
1. 'Where the causes of action are separate and divisible, and the deca.
ration single, it would be error to suffer the plaintiff after having given
evidence of one, to prove another. Hodge v. bi of Rennington,49.
2. Where the issues are distinct, and the verdict is on the material one,
evidence improperly admitted on the other, is not error, and is no grouid
for reversal. Id.
3. Where a plaintiff sues for damages for insufficiency of a highway,
whereby the axle of his wagon was broken, and his horse killed, it is not
error in the court to instruct the jury that he was bound to use such care
as a prudent man would, and if the want of such care in any degree con-
tributed to the accident he could not recover. id.
4. Where a plaintiffin error claimed in the court below, that he was en.
titled to have a note held by him made by the defendant in errorpaidin gold
or silvercoin underthe Constitution, upona proper construction of various
clauses of thatinstrument, and the decision of the court below was against
the right thus claimed, the Supreme Court of the United States has appel-
late jurisdiction underthe 25th section of the Ju~diciary Act of 1789, or the
2d section of the Amendatory Judiciary Act of 1867, to review the decis-
ion. The case of RooseveU v.-Meyer, 1 Wallace 512, overruled. Zrebiacock v.
"Wison, 151.
5. The refusal to permit a question asked on cross-examination to be
answered, is no ground for reversal, where it could not have prejudiced
the losing party. fissouri River Railroad v. Richards, 328.
6. No appeal lies from an order refusing to sign a bill of exceptions.
March v. Band, 532.
ESTOPPEIL. See AOExr 17; BANK, 4; CoRAcT, 8; ErcraY, 1; Licz sr.
1. It is a general rule of law and equity that a party may always plead,
prove and rely on the truth of any transaction in the determination of his
rights, unless he would commit a fraud on the! adverse party. Clark v.
Coolidge, 58
2. Estoppels in pais only apply where the party doing the act or making
the admission, knows the truth of the matter, or has better means of
knowing it, than the adverse party. 1d.
3. The doctrine of estoppel applies in actions relating to real property,
as well as personal. Finnegan v. Caraher, 460.
4. A party to a chancery suit concerning a dominant tenement, who af.
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terward becomes seized of the servient tenement, is not estopped from
asserting that by the true construction of the deeds, the easement is ex-
tinguished. Glenn v. Dats, 531.
5. Where the only surviving beneficiary named in a mortgage actively
aidsand assists the mortgagor in selling the property, without mentioning
his claim, he will be estopped from setting it up against the purchaser.
Bigelow, Admin'z, v..bss, 593.
6. The declarations of the real party in interest, though hi is not the party
of record, are evidence against him. Id.
7. Where the parties to a deed signed in blank have acquiesced for two
and a half years in the possession of a party who bona fide purchased land
under it, they will be estopped from claiming on account of the irregular-
ity. Rinaggs v. Mastin, 774.
EVIDENCE. See CRIMINAL LAW,1 o, 17,24, 30, DEED 1-3; ESTOPPEr, 6; INSANITY,1;
INSOLVENT, 2; INSURANCE, 1, 10; JUDGMENT, 7; MOMTGAGE, 8; PARTNERSIP, 9
RECOnD, I.
1. Conversation held by the parties to a written contract at the time it
was made, is admissible to prove that the writing was not the agreement.
Hoagv. Owen, 58.
2. Under the act of 1861 of Maryland, making parties to suits competent
witnesses, a party cannot offer in evidence his own declarations in his own
behalf. iend v. H mill, 58.
S. In an action of debt to recover the purchase-money of land sold, the
defense being fraud in misrepresenting the value, evidence that the plain-
tiff had a higher offer is inadmissible. .Negley v. Lindsay, 193.
4. A deed containing the same discrilfon as the articles, but imperfect,
s admissible in evidence, in suit to recover the purchase-money. Id.
5. In an action fordeath from negligence, on accountof cartheing struck
by cars, when on scales near the track, evidence thatthe traekwas moved
after the accident is proper. West Chester Racilroad Co., v. McElwee, 200
6. Where certain acts of plaintiff are in evidence before the jury tending
to show fraud. he may state the reason for doing them, to rebut the pre-
sumption. Janvrin v. Fogg, 268.
7. The admission of parol evidence to contradict a note and prove con-
ditions not expressed therein is error. Letter v. Fowier, 331.
& Where the only objection to the admission in evidence of a certain
mortgage was that it was not properly stamped, and that could not have
affected the verdict, it may be stamped after verdict and then judgment
entered. Janvrtn v. Fogg, 334.
9. Declarations to be admissible as part of the res gestae must be con-
temporaneous with some act they serve to explain. State v. Montgomery,
395.
10. It is no objection to the admission of a deed in evidence, that it was
not recorded until after suit was brought. Russell v. Sweezey, 460.
11. A press copy of a letter is not legal and admissible evidence in the
absence of notice to produce the original. Marsh v. Hand, 461.
12. The only proper evidence of the Insolvency of the estate of a de-
ceased person is the documentary evidence of the probate office. Bates v.
Avery, 462.
13. Evidence to explain a written contract Is only admissible when
words have been employed which are ambigaous or of equivocal mean-
Lug. NWorth American rns. Co.. v. Throop, 462.
IL Evidence ofa parol aareement alleged to have accompanied the deliv-
ery of a deed, and varying its terms is Inadmissible. Beers v. Beers, 531.
15. In an action of covenant on a deed, where the declaration alleges the
deed to be made by the defendani, in %ich the defendant did covenant for
themselves and their heirs, a deed matdn by defendant and wife, the land
not being the individual property of the wife, is admissible in evidence.
.7ooey v. Smth. 91.
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16. Nor will the fact the premises are not described in the same words
as in the declaration be any objection to its admission. Id.
17. In an action of covenant by a grantee, to recover the amount of an
outstanding tax, he was compelled to pay, paxol evidence is admissible by
grantor to prove that grantee agreed to pay the tax at the time of sale.
.Dearborn v. More, 594.
18. Though the declarations of a grantor at the time of a conveyance to
his sons are admissible to show whether it, was an advancement, they
must not coiltradict the plain terms of writing. Sandford v. Sahimford,
594.
19. The declarations of a father, subsequent to the conveyance, when he
could not revoke the deeds, are not admissible. Id.
20. The evi-idence of an attorney who drew a will, in accordance with an
agreement made at the time, between the testator and his wife, is admis-
sible to prove what was said as to a bequest and the agreement. Id.
21. The declarations of one of several persoIs engaged in a concerted at-
tack upon a dwelling, made while the attack is going on, are admissible
against all; otherwise it the attack has terminated. &ate v. Pike, 661.
22. An admission by one that he is an agent is evidence of the fact against
him. AMsher v. Kratz C bmpbeU, 773.
EXECUTION. See DEBTOR AND CRETmOR; I!sURA,cy 4; rARTHSRHIP, 4.
A sale on mesne process, of the property of a stranger, conveys no title to
vendee, and the real owner may replevy it. Cbonibs v. Gordon, 5.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.
1. The administrator cannot by a promise in writing take a claim out
from the operation of the st~ute of limitations nor omit to plead it. Ha/
v. Woodman, 38.
2. An administrator, whether the estate issolvent orinsolvent,is bound
toexecutehis trast ina reasonable time, and if he delay to apply theland
forthe payment of debts for an unreasonable time his lien will be lost. id.
3. Case will not lie against executors as such, for damages caused by
raising a dam on decedent's land. where the lalid has vested in the execu-
tors and others under the will. Pi ipon v.. Richards, i5.
EXPERT. See WiTmas, 13, 14.
FENCES. See TResPAss, 7.
Trespass caunot be maintained against a suIveyor of highways for re-
moving fences that have been less than forty yeat within the location oi
a highway. Whittier v. YcIntyre, 595.
FINES AND PENALTIES.
While an insurance and loan company may have the right to impose a
fineon a memI)er, for non-payment of dues, aftertenderof the amount due,
it cannot proceed with the imposition of fines for the refusal to pay the
first fine. Pent- v. iizens' Fire Ins. Co., 33.
FISHERY. See WATERs AND WATERCOUsES, 2.
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER. See CRIMIAL LAw.
FOR-AIER RECOVERY. See VE.DOR, 18.
FRAUD. See BILLS AND NOTS, 6; EQUITY, 18.
FRAUDS, -TATUTE OF. See BILLS AND -NOTES, 10; HIUsBAND AWD WIF7, 15.
1. Under the statute of frauds a distinction is made between a contract
for the sale of goods and one for work and labor in the manufacture o1
them. The former only is made void by the statute unless it be in writ.
ing. P a.y.sic Me1an'g Cb. v. lIof, ,ea, 105.
•2. Where the contract is foran article coming ider the general denomi-
nation of goods, wares, or inerehaldis., and is made with one who makes
and sells that kind of article to ail who talffic in ii, the quantity required
and the price beingagreed upon, it is a contract of sate, whether tie maker
INDEX. 801
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
and vendor has the required quantity on hand or has to 'make it after.
ward. Id.
3. Bal if what is contemplated by the agreement is the skill, labor, care,
or knowledge of the maker; or if it would not have beenproduced except
for the order; or if it is ordered at a certain price with the.knowledge that
the maker is not supplied and will have to make it; or if, when produced,
it is unfitted for sale as a genaral article of merchandise, being adapted
only for use by the person ordering it, then the contract is one for work
and labor, and not within the statute. Id.
4. The cases on this subject examined and discussed by DALY, C. J. Id.
5. Proof of a parol contract, delivery of possession, payment ofpurchase-
money in part and valuable improvements, are sufficient to take a case
out of the statute. MLiliken v. Dravo, 197.
6. Resulting estates or those created by operation of law are not made
Void by the statute of frauds of Kans4s. M ore v. Wade, 3033.
GOLD. See CoIN, 1.
GUARDIAN.
1. Any transactions between a guardian and a ward recently arrived at
age, by which the guardian obtains aunadvantageor bounty, wil be deemed
pritmafale fraudulent, on account of the recent confidential relations of
the parties, and the burden of proof will be upon tie beneficiary to show
that the gift or arrangement was fair and conscientious. Garvin v. Wil-
liam, 642.
2. Evidence In this case held not sufficient to support a verdict in favor
of the guardian. Id.
GUARANTY.
1. An extension of the time of payment of a bond does not discharge a
guarantor, if the agreement to extend was made after the maturity of the
bond. Hays v. Wells, 59.
2. An agreement to extend which will diseharga a surety must be such
as in law will amount to an estoppel upon the creditor to prevent him
bringing suit until the extension expires. Id.
3. An agreement to extend will not be inferred from the acceptance by
the holder of a bond, of a collateral security, which does not mature until
after the bond. Id.
4. Where two bills of goods were sold at different times, one for$230, and
one for $110, upon a written guaranty "to let bearer buy merchandise to
amount of $.O0 or $,300, the guarantor's liability will be confined to the first
bill. Reed v. Fish, 461.
5. A guaranty of payment imposes an oblig-ation to pay at the maturity
of thesecurlty, and the holder need not wait for the resultofa suit against
the principal debtor, but inay denand the money from the guarantor im.
mediately upon the dishonor of the paper. City of .lfeMniphls v. Brown, 629.
HABEAS CORPUS.
1. Where a United States officer, holding a prisoner by United States au-
thority is served with a writ of habeas corpus Issued by the State author-
ity, is it his duty to make due return to the writ; and he acts within the
true spirit of the law by producing the body of his prisoner before the
court or judge issuing the writ. United Slates v. Doss, 320.
2. Where such oflicer makes return showing ihat lie holds the prisoner
by United States authority, the Stateauthorityshould abstainfroin longer
interfering with the case, and all its proceedings thereafter are illegal.
11.
3. Where a prisoner Is held for an offense over which the United States
and the State in which it was connaitted have concurrent jurisdiction,
the government which first assumes jurisdiction will retain it until final
judgment. .d.
4. If a State judge, in combination with others, misuse his position and
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office by making use o the law and his power for the purpose of accom-
plishing an improper release, he, and those acting with him, are liable
criminally for obstructing process of the United States. Id.
5. But if the judge acts bona fide he is not liable criminally, notwith-
standing his acts are illegal for want ofjurisdiction. Id.
9. Where a prisoner is brought before a judge in obedience to a writ, of
habeas corpus, he is under the control of the judge, the writ of habeas cor-
pus having superseded the original process, and therefore, a peiNon taking
charge of the prisoner under the order of the judge issuing the writ, can-
not, for that act alone, be held guilty of obstructing United States process
Id.
HIGHWAY. See DAXAGES 6; Street.
L A person must be in the use of a highwayfor the purpose of travel in
order to be entitled to recover damages on account of its insufficiency.
Sykes v. Town of 1'awlet, 59.
2. The obstruction of a highway is a common nuisance and the remedy
is by indictment, unless an individual has suffered some special damage
Houck v. Wachter, 60.
8. The mere fact that by an obstruction one individual suffers more than
others, will not entitle him to an action. Id.
4. Plaintiff was entitled to recover for breaking his gig, owing to the in
sufficiency of the road, although a defect in the gig contributed to the ao-
cident, where there was no want of ordinary care on his part. Fletcher v.
2bwoM of Barnet, 197.
5. In. action for obstructing a pent road through defendant's laud, the
title to the land is not sufficiently involved to oust the .urisdiction of a
justice of the peace. BeU v. .ProtOy, 197.
6. The laying out of a highway without application for it, is invalid.
&ate v. Morse, 33L
7. There is no presumption that a highway has been laid out agreeably
to statute, from the mere use of it by the public for any period less than
twenty years. Id.
& So long as the highway once established is kept open and fenced out,
and the public never excluded, the right of the public will not be deemed
lost by abandonment. Id.
9. Where a road is established by use alone, lit Is not necessarily limited
to the traveled track, but extends over the usual width of a highway.
Id.
10. The right of flowing lands under the Mill-dam Act of Kansas, does
not include the right to overflow or obstruct a highway. Venard v. Cross,
334.
1L There is a duty upon towns and cities to keep their highways in safe
condition for traveling by foot passengers as well as others. Landolt v.
City of Norwich, 383.
12. But this duty as applied to ice and snow on a sidewalk is not a duty
to keep the sidewalks absolutely free from ice, and the liability of the
city for injuries received by a fall on the ice, is to be determined In each
case by the particular circumstances existing in that case. Id.
HOLIDAY. See BILLS AND NOTs 30.
HOMESTEAD. See BAKnurTOY, 2.
1. STAY AD EXEMPTI ON LAws, 20..
2. Awidow is not entitled to a homestead and personal exemption out ot
the intestate's property, in addition to her dower. Rust v .Bilingslea, 332.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
I Marriage and Divorce. See CONTRACr, 14.
1. AcTioNs Pon BREACH or ROMISE OF MARRIAGE, 65.
2. The Supreme Court at general term may not only entertain an appeal
from an order granting alimony, but may order a zeference to ascertain a
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suitable amount. Gatinger v. Galinger, 197.
S. A decree for divorce should not direct the payment by the defen-
dant of arrears of alimony; the plaintiff must enforce payment In the
usual way. Td.
4. Where the defendant's property amounted to $12,5) over and above
his debts, alimony to the amount of $300 per annum was sufficient. Id.
5. The Court of Chancery in New York had no Jurisdiction to grant
divorces independent of the statutes. Crain v. Carana, 6M1.
6. The court by the revised statutes, is not authorized to grant a sum
in gross on separation a mensa el there by way of allowance to the wife,
and in lien of dower. Id.
7. Such provision in the decree being void, the wife's claim on her de-
ceased husband's estate is unaffected by it. d.
8. Divorce a vinculo in New Hampshire, bars dower. Gleason v. Emer-
son, 722.
II. Curtesy and Dower. See DEEo, 7, 8; HO.EsTEAD, 2; ante, 8.
9. A widow is entitled to dower in lands bargained by her husband to
another during his life, the purchase-money, however, not being paid
until his death, the title remaining in him. Slaughter v. COupepper, 331.
10. Dower once extinguished cannot be revived. -?ey v. .Boylan, 774.
ILL Separate state of Wrife and Estate by Entireties.
11. Where a wife has an equitable interest in land conveyed to her hus-
band by reason of her having paid part of the purchase-money, it will be
protected against her husband's subsequent creditors. Lodmode v. Canp-
bell, 59.
12. The mere delivery of a horse to the husband for the wife, without
any act or declaration by him, is not a waiver of his marital rights, and
such horse is liable to be seized for the debt of the husband, although
paid for by the wife. Davis v. Zimmerman, 128.
13 Where a married woman purchases a lot and builds a house with
money obtained from her husband, and afterward exchanges the house
and lot for personal property, such property will be deemed her separate
estate. Elder v. Cordray, 129.
14. A parol agreement, by the husband, made before marriage, that
property belonging to his wife when sole should remain hers, prevents
her title being divested by the marriage, and if she is subsequently di-
vorced she may maintain trover against a purchaser from the husband
Child v. -Pearl, 129.
15. The statute of frauds is no shield for the defendant because the
title was always in the plaintiff. Id.
16. In New York a married woman may carry on any trade or business
or perform any labor, and the earnings and profits belong to her exclu-
sively and are her separate estate. boster v. Cbnger, 396.
17. An assignment of a policy of insurance, on the life of a husband,
obtained for the sole and separate use of tie wife, if made bythe husband
and wife for the benefit of his creditors, is valid. Eneraick v. Cbakley, 46L
18. The forbearance of the creditors is a valid consideration. Id.
19. A married woman while residing with her husband may charge,
her separate estate for necessaries used in the family. Tillman v. Shackle-
ton, 461.
20. Neither the common law nor the statutes of Michigan authorize a
married woman, prior to 18W5, to take a (lead of real estate and give a
mortgage for the purchase-money, and both were void. Savagev. Holyoke
461.
21. In Kansas a married woman may contract, sell, convey and be sued,
In reference to her separate estate, as freely as any other person. .Ebaggs
v. Mastin, 774.
IV. Actions by and against tisband and Wi7fe.
22. In an action brought against a husband and wife by judgment-credi-
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tors, to set aside conveyances made by them, neither the testimony, acts
nor declarations of the husband can be used to implicate the wife or divest
her of her estate. Lormore v. Campbell, 60.
23. A suit brought by a husband and wife for personal injuries received
by the wife does not survive to the husband. SIlmarsh v. Candid, 266.
24. Where husband obtains a verdict, and after becoming administrator
is willing to ratify what has been done, still the verdict must be set aside.
Id.
25. Where the vendee of land sold by a married woman cannot get pos-
session as stipulated for, on account of a lease, he is entitled to a defense,
in an action on a bond given for the purchase-money, to the extent of his
injury, notwithstanding the coverture. Cross v. Noble, 266.
26. The vendor's defense was not setoff, which is a cross-action, and in
which the personal liability of the vendor to damages would have arisen.
Id.
27. Had the whole purchase-money been paid the vendee could not have
sustained an action against the vendor. Id.
28. In an actioh to recover the consideration of a sale, the defendant may
show that it has failed in whole or in part. Id.
29. A husband is not liable to an attorney, for professional services ren-
dered his wife in defending a libel for divorce by the husband against her
upon the ground of adultery, even though I such defense may prove suc-
cessful. Bay v. Adden, 702.
30. Where a husband charges his wfd before a justice of the peace, with
having threatened him with personal violence, and fails to sustain such
charge, he will be held liable to the attorney of the wife, in an, action
brought to recover for services rendered upon her retainer. Wauier v.
feiden, 299.
31. Whether his presence when the services were rendered, and making
no objection thereto, would make him liable on an implied promiseto pay
for them. qutsre. I&
32. A husband cannot without authority acknowledge service of a sum.
mons for his wife. Moore v. Wade, 396.
13. A judgment determining that a woman has no right In certain land,
except such as she has as wife, affects her substantial rights. Id.
34. In New Yiork a married woman may su and be sued upon allbargains,
obligations and liabilities, the same as if she were sole. Foster v. Conger,
396.
35. If an action is brought against her in reference to her business, it is
brought in the same manner as against any other individual. Id.
36. 'Where a wife, in Georgia makes a contract for her own labor, with
her husband's consent, she to receive the compensation, she may sue in
her own name .fe-rweather v. Smith, 397.
INFANT. See DEBTOR AND CRDITOR, 11; GuAnDIAff, 1, 2.
1. Neither an infant defendant nor his guardian ad titeru, can consent to
the taking of testimony before a person not properly authorized. !"seher
v. Fisceher, 120.
2. W bere a bill is filed against an infant, to have thetitle of certainlands
vested in the infant, declared to be in trust for complainant, the complain.
ant is not a competent witness in his own behalf, either at common law or
under the act of 1867 of Illinois. Id.
3. A contract by n-hich a minor paid his bounty money to his master for
his consent to his enlistment, may be rescinded by the minor's adminis-
trator, and the money recovered back. Ditnsmore v. Webber, 533.
INJUNCTION. See TAXTIOx, 1,2,3,
1. To entitle a party to a preliminary injunction, his right must be clear
and free from doubt, or established by proceedings at law. Hackensack
Imp. Co. v. .New Jersey M. B. B., 56.
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2. Where the principles of law onwblch therigbt rests, are disputed,and
admit of doubt, a court of equity will not grant an injunction. Id.
3. An injunction must not issue where the benefit to be secured is of
little importance, while it will operate oppressively on the defendant. Id.
4. Filling the air around a dweling-house with dense smoke and soot or
cinders, and with noxious vapors, so as to make it uneomfortable, is a nui-
sance, and will be restrained by injunction. Duncan v. H-ayes, 132.
5. A court of equity will not restrain by injunction any lawful business,
or the erection of anybuilding for such business, becauscit is alleged such
business will be a nuisance to a dwelling-house near it. Id.
6. No lawful occupation will be restrained or interfered with, unless it
will actually interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life. id.
7. Increased risk from fire, and the consequent large rates of insurance
are no ground for injunction. Id.
8. A preliminary injunction will not be granted on doubtful points of
constitutional law, nor to restrain the execution of laws that may be used
unwisely or injuriously. Inhabitants of Greenville v. Seymour, 26S.
9. But the perversion or abuse of delegated powers, either actual or
threatened, will be restrained. Id.
10. Injunction denied where the provisions of acts, thoughimpolitle and
oppressive, are within the power of the legislature. Id.
11. Will not be granted when an action of ejectment will restore com-
plainant's rights. Morris Ctnal Co. v. Rigin, 268.
12. The granting of an injunction to restrain encroachments on a canal,
considered as a highway, will depend on the extent they Impede naviga-
tion. Id.
13. Will not lie to restrain acts that may possibly cast a cloud upon the
title of a party. Phelps v. City of Walertown, 397.
14. An existing injunction can only be removed upon notice and motion
to dissolve. Iranhattan Fertilizing Co., v. Van Keasen, 774.
INSANITY. See PrAcTrcE, 2.
1. Opinions of witnesses not experts cannot be received on questions of
sanity. Mtate v. Jones, 661.
2. All symptoms and all tests of mental disease are questions of fact for
the jury. Id.
INSOLVENT. See BAwictupTcy, 9.
1. Thesimple omission of a pajileular debt in a petition for a discharge as
an insolvent, will not vitiate the discharge. Ball v. Robbins, 266.
2. The record of an insolvent's discharge in Massachusetts must be held
conclusive in New York. Ii.
INSURANCE. See AGENT, 7; DAMSAGES, 6.
1. A policy together with the application, is primafacie evidence of the
title of the insured to the property embraced in the policy. Kansas In..
Co., Berry, 60.
2. The mortgagee bas no claim in law or equity on the proceeds ofa pol-
icy effected by the mortgagor unless the policy has been assigned to him.
Id.
3. Where the policy refers to the application, ." for a more full and par-
ticular description" the application is made a part of the contract.
Shoen7:er v. Glen's Falls hIT. C)., 130.
4. The execution creditor is not entitled to the proceeds of a policy, in
ease of a loss by fire, by reason of a levy on the premises. .Plimpton v.
.Farmers' Mutual Is. Co., 130.
5. Where a policy contained a clause that it should not be assigned with-
out insurers' consent, and It was so assigned, as collateral security for a
lien, the assured cannot recover in case of loss, although he afterward
paid the lien. Ferree v. Oxford Ins. Co., 197.
6. Where a policy contained a clause that it should be void in case of as-
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signmeni, unless ratified by the company within thirty days, and after as-
signment but before the application for ratification reached the company
a loss occurred, on a refusal by the directors to ratify the assignment the
assignee will be entitled to a decree for the 'full amount his assignor could
have recovered. Boynton v. Farmers' Ins. (b., 198.
7. A policy of insurance provided that no suit or claim thereon shouldbe
sustainable unless made within twelve months after the loss ; and that
in any Euch suit commenced twelve months after the loss the lapse of
time should be conclusive evidence against the validity of the claim. A
loss occurred and the insured was prevented by the warfrom bringing suit
within twelve months: Held, That the war having rendered compliance
impossible, the presumption from the lapse of time was thereby destroyed
and did not revive by the cessation of the war; and the insured might re-
cover if his action was brought within the period of the statute of limita-
tions. Semms v. City F. . Co.. 418.
8. The period of the statute of limitations is to be computed by exclud-
ing the time of the war. Id.
9. In a marine policy, where property is insured described as $6,550 on
charter, $2.650 on primage and also $1.500 on property on board ship C. J.
Pennell "at and from New York to San Francisco," the last phrase is not
descriptive of the property, but simply of the voyage. Mfelcher v. Ocean
Ins. Co., 595.
10. And where the vessel is sailing under two charters, parol evi-
dence is admissible to prove which charter is insured. Id.
11. The assured, in a life policy, in reply to the question, had she ever
had a serious personal injury, answered no. She had, ten years before,
fallen from a tree. The criteria of a serious personal injury considered.
Insurance Cb. v Wilkinson, 485.
12. This is not to he determined exclusively by the impressions of the
matter at the time, but its more or less prominent influence on the health,
strength, and longevity of the party is to be taken Into account, and the
Jury are to decide from these and the nature of the injury whether it was
so serious as to make its non-disclosure avoid the policy. Id.
13. Insurance companies who do business by agencies at a distance from
their principal place of business are responsible for the acts of the agent
within the general scope of the business-intrusted to his care, and no lim-
itations of his authority will he binding on parties with whom he deals
which are not brought to their knowledge, Id.
14. Ifence, when these agents, in soliciting insurance, undertake to pre-
pare the application of the insured, or make any representations to the
insured as to the character or effect of the statements of the application,
they will be regarded, in doing so, as the agents of the insurance compan-
ies, and not of the insured. Id.
15. This principle is rendered necessary by the manner in which these
agents are sent over the country by such companies, and stimulated by
them to exertions in effecting insurance, which often lead to a disregard
of the true principles of insurance as well as fair dealing. Md.
16. In such cases the insurers cannot protect themselves under instruc-
tions to their agents that they are only agents for the purpose of receiv-
ing and transmitting the application and the premium. Id.
17. Therefore, where the agent had inserted in the application for life
insurance a representation of the age of the mother of the assured at the
time of her death, which was untrue but which the agent himself obtained
from a third person, and inserted without time assent of the assured, it was
the act of the company, and not of the assured, and did not invalidate the
policy. Id.
1s. To permit verbal testimony to show how this was done by the agent
does not contradict the written contract, though the application was
signed by the party. It proceeds on the ground that it was not his state-
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mont, and that the insurance company, by the acts of their agent in the
matter, are estopped to set up that it is the representation of the assured.
Id.
19. Where the preliminary proofs of a loss were received by the insurers
without objection, ani payment refused on other grounds, any defects in
the proofs must considered as waived. Taylor v. Boger 1WiamsIs. b , 72-2.
INTEREST.
1. Though courts will not enforce an executory contract for the payment
of compound interest, yet where it is knowingly paid it cannot be recov-
ered back. Culver v. Bigelow, 135.
2. Under a contract to pay for land upon the execution of a deed interest
will not begin until tender of the deed. Craft v. Rent el a., 3 9.
3. Where there is no agreement to pay Interest, it is only allowed by
way of damages, for breach of payment of the principal. Southern Centraz
B. B. v Towi of Moravia. 332.
4 Where the principal has been paid and received in full, no action can
be maintained for interest. NU.
INTERNATIONAL LAW. See CONFEDERATE STATES; CUSTOMts.
FIELDS' INTERNATIONAL CODE, 339.
INTERNAL REVENUE. See TAxATION, 5.
JUDGE. SEE OrFICE AND OFFIcER, 3, 4, 5; PRACTicE. 4, I.
JUDGMENT. See ATTACHMENT, 2; CoIN, 3.
1. There is no limitation to the power of a court to open a judgment by
default. Breden v. Gilliland, 267.
2. The lien of the judgment is not disturbed thereby. Id.
3. The opening being discretionary cannot be reviewed. Id.
4. The Court has no power to set aside a Judgment regular on its face.
Id.
5. A judgment in a former suit is no bar to another action, where the
point relied on as adjudicated was ruled out of the defense in the first
suit. Yates v. Lyon, 331.
6. A judgment against a party not served with a summons is erroneous.
.Moore v. Wade, 396.
7. In support of a plea of satisfaction, to a scire faelas to revive a judg-
ment, evidence is admissible of an agreement made prior to the judgment
as to its mode of discharge. Downey v. .27rrester, 33.
8. Where part of ajudgment is for an amount for which the defendant
gave his notes, which were not due when the action was begun, a motion
to set aside the judgment will be entertained. Bowles v. Hoare, 595.
9. Thejudginmit of a State which has wlthdrawu from the Union must
be authenticated on its return, as other State records.. Steere v. Tenney,
660.
10. Records of a foreign government are authenticated as such only dur.
lug its existence as a foreign power. Id.
JUROR ANDJUILY. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 18.
1. The order in which parties shall exercise the right of challenge, is a
matter within the discretion of the court at the trial term. State v. Pike,
2. Whether ajuror Is "itnifferent," and whether a confession wts made
In consequence of inducements, are questions of faet, to bo decided by
the judge preshing at the trial; and no exception lies to ins indluig.
Id.
3. An "impression " formed by one called as a juror, not strong enough
to he likely to prevent a candild judgment upon a full hearing of the evi.
deuce, does not disqualify him to be sworn as a juror. Id.
4. The jury have a right to use their general knowledge in making up
theirverdict. -. .. v. -Bichard, 328.
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JUSTICE OF THE PEACE. See CONSTITUTIOxAL LAW 16; HIGUWAy S.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
1. When the lessee of property agrees to pa all assessments made there-
on, he only agrees to pay such as are valid and can be legally enforced.
Xlark v. COolidge, 58.
2. An estate at will is converted into a tenancy from year to year by the
payment of rent. Rilsby v. Allen, 198.
3. When the estate is converted into a tenancy from year to year, six
months' notice before the end ofa year is necessary to terminate it. .d.
4. The crop made upon a rented place is subject to the lien of the land-
lord for his rent, and subject to levy and sale, notwithstanding it has been
set aside as an exemptidn for the benefit of tenant's family. Bust v. Bit-
lingslea, 332.
5. A tenant for a year is not a purchaser, entitled to notice of equities
against his landlord in favor of third parties., Clark v. Herring, 333.
6. A tenant cannot attorn to one who claims adversely to his landlord,
even to prevent an illegal eviction. Id.
7. When a party sub-lets to another under a contract that the sub-lessee
is to pay the rent due, it is not such a claim for rent by the landlord as
may be enforced against the sub-lessee b distress. Sinih v. Turnley,
333.
8. Where a warrant for a distress is signed! by a person who is in fact
the agent of the landlord, though he may not sign as agent, it is suflL
edent authority. .ean v. Spurrier, 462.
9. A distress made without the precedent authority of the landlord is
valid if subsequently ratified by him. Id.
10. A distraint for more rent than is due does not vitiate a distress. Id.
11. In the absence of previous express stipulations, the lessee of premi.
ses is not entitled to a covenant in the leaseI exempting him from all re-
sponsibility by fire, occurrinj through his, or his employee's negligence.
Bodman v. Murphy, 535.
12. The rent of a dwelling for the purpose of keeping a brothel may be
recovered from the lessee, by suit, if the statxte and the city ordinances
authorize the keeping of brothels. Lyman v. Townsend, 547.
13. A lease of land for one year, with the privilege of three, if not sooner
sold, and "the right to keep and harvest all crops," confers upon the
tenant the privilege of harvesting a crop of wheat after the expiration of
the lease. Brown v. .Parsons, 595.
14. The presumption is that a lease for one year with privilege of seve-
ral, is so on the same terms. Id.
LEASE. See CoupoRATiow 2; LANORD AN TEN .
LEGAL TENDER NOTES.
1. The judgment of the national court of last resort, in May, 1871, that
all debts whether created before or after the passage of the " Legal Ten-
der Act," were payable in the paper issues authorized by Congress, deter-
mined and fixed the rule of legal duty. Kellogg v. Page, 618.
2. Laws authorizing public officers, or trustees under a charter, to do an
act, are to be construed like other statutes, according to the intent of the
legislature in enacting them, to determine whether they are permissive or
iTmperative. Id.
3. The construction of the joint resolution passed in 1870 by the Senate
and House of Representives authoringthe State Treasurer to pay in coin
certain State bonds issued before the passage of the "Legal Terder Act,"
is to be interpreted, not by evidence aliunde but by the lang age used,
circumstances existing at the time, and the exigencies that called for Its
adoption. And it is held that the legislature Intended thereby to enable
the treasurer to conform to the law as then interpreted by the courts, as
to the kind of money with which to pay said Ibonds, and so long as that
interpretation prevailed, and no more. Id.
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4. The bonds in question were due June 1st, 1871, and payment was soon
thereafter denmanded "in coin." Held, that the relator then had no claim
dejure to require payment n coin, under the then interpretation of the
"Legal Tender Act" by the Supreme Court of the United States. Id.
5. Where authority is given to exercise a power beneficial to a citizen.
and the right to the power exercised continues and subsists, courts hold
that the duty to exercise the power is absolute, and will make it imperative.
But this is not a case where courts have ever construed words permis re
to be imperative. Id.
6. There would seem to le no ground for claiming that this joint resolu-
tion, not having had the approval of the Governor, has the character of a
legal enactment. Id.
LEX LOCL
1. The validity of a contract is to be decided by the law of the place
wiere it was made, unless it was agreed either expressly or impliedly
that it should be performed elsewhere; in which case the general rule Is,
that the contract, as to its validity, nature, obligation and interpretation.
Is to be governed by the law of the place of performance. .&iU v. Spear,
497.
2. Contracts, valid by the law of tue place where they are made, are
generally valid everywhere, jure gentinm, and by tacit consent. And if
in the place where the contract is made the policy of the local law would
enforce it, it will also be enforced in the jurisdiction to which a party may
be compelled to resort for the application of a remedy for the violation
of such contract. Id.
3. An exception to this rule, however, consists in this: that no natior,
or State s bound to recognize or enforce any contractswhieh are injurlo- s
to Its own interests or the welfare of its ownpeople, or which are in frt Id
and violation of its own laws. Id.
4. A man is presumed to know and understand not only the laws of the
country wherein he dwells, but also those of the foreign country or State
in which he transacts business. Id.
LIBEL.
1. The jury must say whether the meaning averred in the innu rado
expresses the true meaning of the word. Commonwealth v. Keenan, 18
2. If some of the innuendoes extend the meaning too far, but thei e are
others sufficient to give point to it, the jury may convict under the latter.
I%.
LICENSE.
1. There is an implied license on the part of the vendor for the vendee
to enter the premises of the vendor to take possession of chattels sold to
him. E vans v. Foss, *27,).
2. Although a revocable license such as the grant of a privilege neces-
sary to a permanent business, may by the expenditure of money by the
licensee become a contract which will be enforced by a court of equity, yet
this principle must always depend for itsapplication to any particular case
upon the presumed intent of the parties that the privilege should be com-
mensurate with the business as a right in all events, and not merely as a
voluntary accommodation. Jackson & SIharp Co. v. Railroad Co., 374.
3. It is settled that at law a license cannot create ortransfer any intercst
in land. Hence. a mere license affecting lands is at law always revocable
though granted for a valuable considerltion, and though the licensee may
have expended money on the faith of it. I..
4. This rule is modified in equity by the principle of equitable estoppel,
but equitable estoppel proceeds always on the basis of preventing fraud.
Its effect is to restrain the exercise of a legal light, and this even a court
of equity cannot do unless there has been such conduct as would render
the assertion of the legal right a fr .ud. Id.
52
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5. The creation of a side track connecting with a railroad, at the expense
of plaintiff, and the subsequent expenditure of large sums of money by
him in the erection of car- works, from which cars were delivered by
means of the side track, held not to estop the railroad company from re-
voking their license to connect the side track with the company's track.
2d.
LIEN. See BANKRUTerC, 3; DECEDNNT'S ESTATE. 1; EXECUTORS AND AumItis.
TRATORS, 2o .
1. By the common law, one who has lawful possession of a thing and
expends money or labor on it, has alien and may retain possession until
h4s demand is satisfied. Jacobs v. YEnapp, 664.
2. A sub-contractor, a seriant of the party entitled to the lien, acquires
no interest, by reason of his employer's right. 7d.
3. A statute providing for the enforcement of a lien against the person
or property of one between whom and the plaintiff there was no privity
of contract would be unconstitutional. Id.
LIMITATIONS. See BAILMENT, 5; BILLS AND NoTEs, 20; DECEDENT'S ESTATP, 4;
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 1; INSURANCE, 7, S.
1. The statute of limitations is not an appropriate defense to a bill filed
to establish a lost deed in a chain of title, especially where it is set up
by parties claiming under the lost deed. -ockwell v. Servant, 133.
2. The mere verbal assertion of a claim without entry will not bar the
statute. Iulam v. Welch, 267.
S. A partial payment made upon a note, by one of two administratrlixs,
from the assets of the estate and before the statute of limitations has set
its bar, saves the obligation up to the time of Isuch payment. ffeath, Ad-
nfn'z, v. Grenell, Admin'x, 333.
4. But a payment made out of the funds of, the administratrix cannot
be construed so as to revive the demand against the intestate's estate. Id.
5. The statute will begin to run against a cause of action, to recover
damages for fraudulent representations in a sale of real estate, as regards
encumbrances, the moment the conveyance is made. Vorthrop v. J7ill,
397.
6. It is of no consequenbe that the purchaser did not discover the fraud
within six years. Id.
7. It is the misrepresentations and not the resulting damages which con-
stitute the cause of action. Id.
S. Items of credit to defendant by plaintiff for goods or money -re-
turned," have no tendency to prove a mutual account, within the mean-
ing of the statute of limitations. Campbell v. White, 534.
9. Neither absence from the State, nor residence out of it, will suspend
the running of the statute. Id.
10. Residence out of the State, to have that effect, must be more than a
place of abode, it must be the domicil of the party. Id.
LIS PENDENS. See ATTACHMENT, 1; RES ADJUDICATA.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.
1. To support an action for malicious prosecution the plaintiff must
prove affirmatively, that he was prosecuted, that he was exonerated or
discharged, and that it was both malicious and without probable cause.
Boyd v.C5oss, 53.5.
2. Malice is a question of fact forthejury, and is generally inferred from
want of probable cause, but such presumption is onlyprimafacie,and may
be rebutted. From express malice, however, want of probable cause can-
not he inferred. Id.
3. Want of probable cause is a mixed question of law and fact. Id.
I Probable cause is a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by cir-
cumstances sufflciently strong to warrant a cautious man in believing an-
other guilty Id.
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MANDAMUS. See COUPORATION, 8.
Is the proper remedy for compelling a court to receive and enter aver-
dict. State of Kansas ex rel. Munkers v. WIatson, 775.
MARRIAGE. See ItUsBAWD AND WIFE, 1.
MASTER AND SERVANT. SeM COMMON CARRIER, 14. 15.
Where a servuant, under the orders and control of another superior ser-
vant, is directed by the latter to do an act not in the usual course of his
duties, and, while so engaged, is injured by the negligence of the superior.
the master is liable to the servant injured. Frost v. U. Pacific B.R. Co.,
101.
MECHANICS' LIEN.
1. A landlord extended a lease by writing, in consideration ofthetenant
making improvements "at his own cost," the building is not subject to a
mechanic's lien for alterations, under the Acts of Assembly of Pennsylva-
nia, of 1811 and 1865, authorizing liens for alterations, with the proviso,
there shall be no lien where the alteration was made by the lessee "with-
out the written consent of the owner." McClintockv. Oresswell, 199.
2. The consent intended by the acts is an absolute consent, consistent
with the right to do the work on the credit of the building. Td.
MERGER. See AGREEMENT, 1; ALLEY.
MIL TARY SERVICE.
1. Under the Reconstruction Acts of Congress, appointments to civil
offices by the General commanding, were by virtue of the acts and con-
ferred title to the offices only while they were in force. Stone v. lWetmore,
2. Whet General Terry removed Wetmore, and appointed Stone to the
office of ordinary, though he was commissioned by the Governor, he bad
no such right to the office as courts could recognize. Id.
MORTGAGE. See INsuunAc 2, SmrPPIN, 4,7.
1. The equity of a subsequent mortgagee, without notice of the vendor's
claim,to machinery sold under a condition that It shall remain the pro-
perty of the vendor until paid for, is paramount to that of the vendor.
Darenport v. hunts, 60.
%. If themachiucryis not put upuntil after the execution of the mortgage,
the right of the conditional vendor is paramount to the mortgagee. .td.
3. A mortgage that has been satisfied and delivered up, maybe again de-
livered as a valid security by the mortgagor. Underhill v. Atwater, 130.
4. A mortgage given by a married woman as collateral security for debts
contracted by her husband's brother in continuing the husband's business
is discharged by the release of the brother from such debts. rd.
5. Although no express power is given to use or pledge a mortgage for
a particul,r purpose, such power may be inferred from c rcumstances.
Icd.
6. A complainant to whom a mortgage has been assigned for a specific
debt, can only have a decree for that debt, though the whole mortgage is
assigned to him pending the suit. Id.
7. A deed given as a security, decreed to be a mortgage, and grantor al-
lowed to redeem, Sweet v. Parker, 265.
8. In a suit to have an absolute deed decreed a mortgage, parol evidence
is admissible to establish the true nature of the instrument. Id.
S. Delay in asserting a deed to be a mortgage has not the same effect in
equity as delay in the enforcement of an executory contract. Id.
10. The only effect of delay is its bearing on the question of mortgage or
no mortgage. Id.
11. A mortgagee in possession of personal property cannot bold it as
pledgee, if the mortgage proves to be void. Tahnrrin v. Fogg, 267.
12. The creditors of a mortgagec maty take and hold property in posses-
sion of the mortgagee under a fraudulent mortgage discharged from the
lien of the same. Td.
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13. Possession by the mortgagee ofpersonalproperty, answers instead of
the record of the mortgage. Id.
14. Where the two estates are united in the mortgagee, by a release of
the right of redemption, the mortgage will stillbe held as existing in order
to protect the title. Stanton v. Thompson, 267.
15. Whether the mortgage shall be kept on foot, or not, is ordinarily de-
pendent upon the Intention of the parties. Td
16. A deed absolute on its face, but in fact a mortgage cannot have its
legal efrect changed except by payment or release. Odenbaugh v. Brad-
ford 267.
17. XORTGAGES TO SEcunp FuTmm ADVA.OES, 273.
IS. Individual property is not embraced bya mortgage executed bypart-
ners on their partnership property unless specifically mentioned. Beid v.
Goodwin, 333.
19. A deed absolute on its face, if taken as a security, is only a mortgage.
Moore v. WTade, 397.
20. It is only necessary to show a state of facts outside of a deed which
would render the deed a mortgage to make it one. Id. •
21. A court of equity has power to decree a foreclosure of a junior mort-
gage and a sale of the mortgaged property thereunder subject to the out-
standing lien of a senior mortgage. Penn v. Railway Cb., 57Q.
22. The 974th section of the Code of Civil Proceedings of Ohio does not
interfere with the exercise of such power. .,d
23. The right in equity to redeem the mortgaged property. belongs
to every person who has a legal or equitable! lien on the same, provided
he comes in as privy in estate with the mortgagor. Id.
24. Where a Junior incumbrancer pays the amount due on a prior incum-
brance, he is entitled to be subrogated to the rights of such prior incum.
brancer as against the mortgagor. Id.
25. But where the interest only upon the debt secured by the prior mort-
gage is due, and the same is paid by a subsequent mortgage, his lien upon
the mortgaged property, which results from such payment, will
be postponed to the payment of the residue of the prior mortgage debt.
.rd.
26. A mortgage on all the stock in a certain store, and any additions that
may be made thereto, with an indorsement that the mortgagors having
moved to another store, the within mortgage shall cover all the original
stock and all additions, will give to the mortgagee a title to the stock in
the second store at the time of the indorsement. Brown v. Thompson,
599.
27. A mortgage of goods in a store, with a verbal agreement that mort-
gagor shall retain possession and sell them, is void as to ereditors. Put-
nam v. Osgood, 662.
28. Where the mortgagee was indebted to the mortgagoron account, and
it was agreed to apply it in payment by both parties, it will be considered
as a payment in money. Id.
29. An account rendered by a mortgagor to an attacking creditor is not
necessarily falsewithin the statute of New Hampshire, because bymistake
it is greater than the amount actually due. Id.
30. Where a conveyance of real estate, and a separate defcasance there-
of, are dated on different days, though delivered on the same day, they do
not necessarily constitute a mortgage. Haines v. Thomson, 660.
31. Parol evidence is admissible of the distinctive acts of the parties, or to
show that some time has elapsed, or some circumstance has occurred to
satisfy the court that the contracts were separate, but not-of the mere
understanding of the parties, or their belief as to the legal effect of their
acts. Id.
82. Where a deed of antecedent date, founded upon an acknowledged
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sale, is alleged to be changed into a mortgage by a subsequent defeasance,
the burden of proof is upon the party averring the change inits character.
Id.
33. The fact that the consideration in the deed was the full value of the
property repels the idea that the conveyance was intended only as a se-
curity. So, also, the fact that there was no obligation on the part of the
plaintiffs to pay the debt is inconsistent with the idea thatthe transaction
amounted to a mortgage. Id.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See ATroa-Ev 4; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5, 13;
EqUvT'', 9.
1. The issue of small notes by the city of Richmond, in 1861, was in viola-
tion of the laws of the State, and such notes were void. Thomas v. Ci ty of
Richmond, 131.
2 Where it is against public policy, as well as express law for a person
or body corporate to issue small bills as currency, it is certainly not one
of the implied powers of a municipal corporation. Id.
3. The Acts of 1862 of the so-called legislature of Virginia could not make
such notes valid. Id.
4. Where a plaintiff Is not in par! delicto with the defendant, actions are
sustained to recover money received for obligations of the defendant,
though the obligations themselves cannot be sued on. Id.
5. This rule does not apply in the case of municipal corporations issuing
small bills as currency. Id.
6. Where the proper village authorities, lavingpower to make contracts
on its behalf, assume officially to enter into an engagement which only
the corporation could properly make, and in so doing declare themselves
and their successors bound by its conditions, it will be deemed the con-
tract of the corporation, and not of the officers. Gale v. Zalamazoo,
286.
7. The trustees ofavillage are incompetent to makea contract bywhich
the governing authority abdicates any of its legislative powers, or by
which it is precluded in the future from legislating in regard to any emer-
gencies that may arise. Id.
8. The trustees upon whom are conferred the legislative powers are
invested with no discretion to circumscribe their limits, or diminish
their efficiency, but must transmit them unimpaired to their successors.
d.
9. A contract, by which the village of Kalamazoo bound itself to take
charge of a market-house for a period of years, and to provide by ordi-
nance for renting the stalls, and confining the sale of certain articles
thereto, created a monopoly, was contrary to the policy of the law, and
could not be tolerated. Id.
10. No action lies on such contract azainst the trustees of the village,
for a refusal by the village to exercise its corporate legislative powers
in taking charge of the market-house and renting the stalls. Id.
11. When contracts have been made, acts done, and labor performed in
pursuance of a construction of a city charter, acquiesced in by all its citi-
zens. such construction will be sustained if justified byany possible read-
ing of the statutes. City of Memphisv. Br'own, 629.
12. In reference to all acts which a municipal corporation has power in
any mode and by any agency, to perform, it may bind itself by those
agents whom it suffers to act for it, and in the modes which it sanctions
by its own usages, unless such modes and agencies are prohibited by the
charter. Id.
13. Where the charter prescribes votes of stockholders, citizens, or direc-
tors, or other formalities as conditions precedent to the performance of
acts, and such acts are performed without such formalities, third persons
acting in good faith may presume all has been done which the charter de-
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manded, and the corporation will not be suffered to prove its own negli-
gence or willful dereliction to defraudinnocent parties of theirlabor, prop-
erty or money. Id.
14. A municipal, like a private corporation, may, in the ordinary course
of its government, and in the conduct of improvements it is its duty to
execute, make promissory notes, bonds, guarantees, and all other agree-
ments necessary or convenient foP the economical and proper financial
management of its affairs as fully asa naturalperson. Id.
15. The mayor, city attorney and treasurer, of the corporation having
ordinarily been suffered to majke similar agreements, may engage attor-
neys to collect demands due the municipality, when its interests demand
such service. Id.
16. If the service is in a suit in which the city is a party, or in which it Is
interested, and is performed with the knowledge of the officials, the city
is liable for the services in the same manner as a natural person. Judg-
ments holding the contrary depend upon statutes which expressly pro-
hibit such retainers. Id.
17. Where a city constructs a sewer, it is not bound to construct such a
one as will carry off all the drainage under all circumstances. Atchison v.
- CWalifs, 775.
NATURALIZATION. See Courrs4; CmrxNAL LAw27.
NEGLIGENCE. See BILLS AND NorEs, 4; CoXnog CA-nx;a 2, 5; ERRORS AND
AipwPAI 3; EvrnicE 5.
1. Negligence is always a question for the jury, when the measure of
duty is ordinary and reasonable care. West Chester Railroad Co. v .M
Elwee, 200.
2. When the standard of the degree of care shifts with circumstances, it
is always forthe jury. d
8. When the standard is fixed, and tha measure of duty defined by the
law, its omission is negligence and may be declared by the court. 7d.
4. Where there is such disregard of duty and 'safety as amounts to mis.
conduct, the court may declare it negligence. Rd.
5. Where the owner of premises neglects to sufficiently guard the en-
trance to the basement, he will be liable to a pedestrian, who is injured bF
falling into the same. Stratton v. Staples, 576.
6. To entitle a plaintiff to recover against a railroad for injuries sus-
tained, he must show that they were directly caused by want of ordinary
care and prudence on the defendant's partand could nothave been avoided
by the reasonable care and caution of himself. B. & 0. R. . Co. v. Ir-
patrick, 596.
7. If plaintiff has exercised reasonable care, he is entitled to recover for
defendant's negligence, though he has been guilty of some want of caution.
Id.
8. The question of negligence or want of ordinary care, is one of fact for
the jury. Id.
9. Where the question is one of law for the court, it is in a case which
presents some prominent and decisive act, not depending upon surround-
ing circumstances for its quality. Id.
NEGOTIABLE BONDS. See DAmSlAos 15.
NEW TRIAL.
1. The mere fact of a bystander banding a slip of paper to a juror during
the trial of a capital case is no ground for a new trial. 3farttn v..People,
130.
2. Nor where a bystander hands ajuror five dollars which he owes him
3. Will be granted, where, in an action for assault and battery, the jury
were left to consider, a charge of false swearing made by the defendant
against plaintiff, as an element to enhance the damages. Pufterv.Harriz
191.
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4. Will not be granted on the ground of surprise in that a witness of ad-
verse party testified on the trial differently from what he did on a for-
mer trial, when no effort was made to impeach his testimony. Abeles v.
Cohen, 26
5. The rule is that wlinra general verdict delpau~ s upon several qneq-
tions some of which could not have been affected by any error in the riling
of the court, the verdict shall be set aside and a new trial granted only on
those points necessary to correct the error or mistake. ,Tanvrin v. Fogy,
al.
6. Where the error in ruling could not have affected the verdict a new
trial will not be granted. Id.
NOTICE. See RECoRD, 2; TRUST A-ND TRUSTEE, 4; VENDOR AND PURCHASER. 14.
NUISANCE. See Ifianw.%Y. 2; INJUCTION,,, 4; STREET, 3.
1. The principle on which courts of equity grant injunctions in case of
nuisance is the same whether the nuisance is public or private: the injury
must be such as the law cannot adequately redress. Morris Cana Co. v
Fagin, 26.
2. When an individual sustains an injury from a public nuisance differ-
Ing in kind from that sustained by the community, he may bring an action
therefor. Venard v. Cross, 331.
3. Any citizen acting either as an individual or as a public officer under
municipal orders, may abate what the common law deems a public nui-
sance. Manhattan Fertilizing Co. v. Vran Kensen, 774.
4. In abating it property may be destroyed, and theowner receiveneith-
er notice nor compensation. Id.
OFFICE AND OFFICER. See ARREST; CORPORATioN, 7; MILITARY SEaVICE, 1.
L An officer defacto must be in actual possession of the office, if the offi-
cer dejure is in possession there can be no officer defacto for that office.
Mo Chon v. County Corns, 269.
2. The General Assembly has no power to legislate out of office a judge
whose office is created, and whose tenure of office is prescribed bythe Con-
stitution. State v. Draper, 552.
3. Ajudge elected by thd people of the territory over which he has juris-
diction cannot be deprived of his office or authority by transferring his
territory to other jurisdictions. Id.
4. And ajudge so elected cannot be transferredto and jurisdictiongiven
to him over other territory, in which he was not elected, by changing the
number of his circuit or otherwise. Id.
5. The title of an officer holding an elective office comes from the votes
of the people, and not from his commission, and the mere change of the
number of the circuit -for which he is commissioned does not affect his
right or title to the office. .d.
PARDON. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW' 1; CONTRACT, 16.
1. On the hearing of a habeas corpus. it is error for a judge to refuse to re-
ceive a pardon from the Governor, as a ground of discharge. Dominick v.
Bowdonn, 335.
2. Pardons obtained by fraud are void. Id.
3. Pardons before conviction are based upon the confession of the ac-
cused, and before such pardons take effect they must be accepted by the
accused. l.
PARENT AND CHILD. See RAILROAD, 2,3.
1. A parent is under no legal obligation, independent of statutory law,
to maintain his minor child. Kelley v. Davis, 61.
2. A parent cannot be charged for necessaries furnished to his minor
child, except upon a promise expressed or implied. A/.
3. A promise cannot be imupliedl from the omission of a'duty resting on
moral obligation only. d.
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L On partition in equity the court will dispose of all questions between
the parties in relation to the land, and afford complete relief. cM v.
Guer s , 132.
2. Where the title depends upon the construction of a will and the de-
fendants are in possession, the court will not require the plaintiffs to first
try the question of title in an action of ejectment. Id.
3. On a bill for partition, the court will not decree partition at once, if
the parties are agreed, without referring to commissioners. Davidson v.
T7t son, 13L
PARTNERSHIP. See MORTGAGE , 18; WITNESS, R.
1. A secret partnership is where the existence of certain persons as part-
ners is not made known to the public by any of the partners. Deering v.
.Ianders, 61.
2. A person accustomed to deal with a firm, will bold a retiring dor-
inant partner for debts subsequently contracted by the frm, unless he has
notice of the retirement. 2d.
3. Unless all the requisites of the Act of March 30, I5, of Pennsylvania,
relating tospecial partnerships, are strictly complied with, the partner-
ship will be general. Yandike v. Bosskam, 200.
4. On an execution against one partner, the sheriffan only levy on the
interest of the partner in thefirm, he cannot Seize the goods of the firm.
5. The attachment of the separate property of a partner, for a partner-
ship debt, takes precedence of an attachment by a separate creditor, if the
separate debt was not contracted until afterthb laying of first attachment.
. esce v. -ennock, 269.
6, The giving of a note by a new firm, in exchange for a note of the old
frm, will not be deemed a payment, where the payee is ignorant of the
clange of fIrm. Mls v. Marey, 269.
7. If the payee makes an absolute sale of the note without the assent of
the old firm, and thus treats it as his own, he is deemed to have taken it as
payment; Id.
8. Parties holding themselves out to the world as partners will be lia-
ble as such whether they are in fact or ndt. Sankey v. H4, 335.
9; The sayings of one partner are no evidence against another in an issue
of partnership or no partnership. d
10. In the absence of an express agreement one partner cannot charge
another for his personal services in managing the business. Lyon et al. v.
Exl'rs of Snyder, 398.
11 A partner obtaining a lease of the partnership premises, without his
co-partner's consent, and before the partnership ends, will be considered
as holding intrust for the firm. M-tchell v. Reed, 463.
12. It is otherwise where the lease is to begin after the partnership ex-
pires, and there is nothing in the articles contemplating an extension.
d. I
13. A sole suviving partner has the entire legal title to all the partner-
ship assets, and the right to turn them into an available and distributable
form. .Barry v. Briggs, 536.
14. An order appointing a receiver to take charge of the property held
by a surviving partner, is an order divesting the legal estate of such part-
ner, and a decree from which an appeal hes, in any stage of a cause.
Id.
15. PARTxEsHIr BiLL AND NOTES, 537.
PATENT
1. PRIORITY OF INVENTIONI 601.
2. REDUCING AN INVENTION TO PRACTICE, 612, 665.
PASSENGER. See RAILROAD, 1.
1. The United States Express Company hta the use of a portion of the
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baggage car on a passenger train of the Union Pacific Railway Company,
Eastern Division, and their traveling agents, called express messengers,
were allowed to ride on this car without paying fare. Other passengers
were excluded therefrom.
The plaintiff by an arrangement with the express messenger and a
local agent of the express company at the State line, went into this car for
the purpose of learning the route so that he might take the express mes-
senger's place in his absence. The plaintiff was introduced to the express
messenger, as an express messenger learning the route, and afterward he
acted as such assisting the regular express messenger along the route.
The conductor allowed him to ride on the baggage car without paying any
fare. There was plenty of room in the passenger cars for him. He was
not, in fact, an express messenger, norwas he in the employ of the express
company in any manner whatever; the express messenger and the agent
at the State line not having any authority to employ him in any capacity.
The baggage car was turned over and the plaintiff injured: HeEd, in an
action by the plaintiff against the railway company, for damages for such
injuries, that the plaintiff was not a passenger, nor entitled to the rights
of a passenger. . _Pacflc 16.1. Oo. v. 2rro1s. 32
2. A passenger from Baltimore to West Chester, possessing a through
ticket, good over both roads, attempted at the junction to pass from the
Baltimore car and enter the West Chester car, but being encumbered with
bundles, and the West Chester train moving on without stoppingareason-
able time to make a transfer of the passengers, he missed his footing, fell
to the track, and had his right arm crushed by the wheels of the car. 17eld,
1 Under the arrangement between the railroad companies for through
tickets, it was their duty to give a reasonable time for the transfer of pas-
sengers and their baggage. 2. The wrong of the company in not allowing
a reasonable time for such transfer, together with its influence upon the
mind and act of the passenger, should be considered in discussing the
question of negligence. 3. The judge below should have left it to the jury
to say, under all the circumstances in evidence, whether the danger of
boarding the train when in motion was so apparent as to have made It the
duty of the plaintiff to desist from the attempt. He should have left the
question of negligence on the part of the plaintiff to be determined by the
jury upon the circumstances. Johnson v. Railroad Co., 159.
PAYMENT. See MoaTGAGE, 28; PARTNERSHIP, 6,7.
1. A voluntary payment cannot be recovered back. Gilson v. Bingham;
73.
2. A payment of an illegal demand, with full knowledge of the facts,
though made under protest, cannot be recovered back. Commissioners v.
Walker, 33.
PLATFORM. See RIAILnOAn, 5.
PLEADING. See TnEsPASs, 3; Vule.
1. An averment of gross negligence in a declaration against a common
carrier for loss in transportation of goods is usual, and a failure to prove
the negligence is no variance, provided the evidence shows a case under
the rule respecting the liability of carriers. Sargent v. Birchard, 53.
2. In action of debt for the purchase-money of land, a plea that the plain-
tiff was not seized of the land at the date of the agreement for sale, traver-
ses the declaration that the plaintiff was ready at all times to perform the
agreement, and the onus is on the plaintiff to prove title. Negley v. Lind-
say, 194.
PRACTICE. See AoEwT, 6; CrTrzz, 5; ConponkATro, 6; IJ ucTox, 14.
1. Money will not be ordered to be paid into court, which is only admit-
ted to be due by parol, and such admission proved by affidavit. M.1Tighe
v. Dean, 58.
2. Whether there is such a disease as dipsomania, and whether a respon-
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dent had that disease, and whether an act done by him was the product of
such disease, are questions of fact for the jury. State v. Pike, 233.
3. The respondent requested the court to charge, that the respondent's
sauty is a fact to be proved by the State be3 ond all reasonable doubt:
that there is no legal presumption of sanity, which can have any weight
with the jury as a matter of law; and, that there is no legal presumption
of sanity which is a substitute for evidence, or which, as a matter of law,
affects the burden of proof In criminal cases. The court declined so to
instruct the jury; but instructed them, "that every person of mature age
is presumed to be sane, until there is evidence tending to show insanity,
but when there is evidence coming from either side, tending to show In-
sanity, then the State must satisfy the jury beyond reasonable doubt that
the prisoner is sane." Held, that the respondent had no ground of excep.
tion. Id-
4. A judge refusing to sign a bill of exceptions may be be compelled by a
writ grounded on the statute of Westm. 2 ch. 31. Marsh v. Hend, 532.
5. The State can only be recognized as a suitor in legal proceedings by
its legal representatives. The People v. Navarre, 589.
6 It Is the duty of the court to direct what ,verdict the jury shall give,
where the evidence is so preponderating, that if the verdict was against it
the court would set it aside. -ish v. Davis, 664.
7. The converse is equally true that the case must go to the jury where
the evidence Is not so preponderating. !Id.
& In an action for goods sold and delivered, where there is no proof of
delivery, ajudgment in favor of the plaintiff will be reversed. Zvereuv.
.Parks, 724.
9. A general demurrer will not liewhere the demurxant is a properparty.
though no relief can be had against him. Dorsheimer v. Rorback, 773.
10. Service ofa summons on a railway company, by leaving a copy at the
depot, with the ticket agent there will be good. The 31 . & T. R. W. v.
Cirowe, 775.
11. Statements made by a judge out of court are not judicial, and one re.
lying on them does so at his paroil ld
PRE-EMPTION. See VEmwou, 10.
PROCESS. Sea CITIZEN; PRACTICE, 10.
PROMISSORY NOTE. See BILLS AND NOTES.
PUBLIC POLICY. See CONTnAcr, 2,6,17.
RAILROAD. See COM0N CAnnIER; LICENsE, 5; PAssENGER.
1. The conductor of a train has a right to put off a passenger refusing to
pay his fare, using no more force than is necessary to effect his removal.
.Mfc"lure v. P. V. & B. B. Cb., 61.
2. A father is bound by the law to maintain and protect h0 children, it
is a duty incumbent upon himso todo, but still if hefall in that duty, and
a child of tender years wanders from home, and is injured in consequence
of the negligence of another, the neglect of the father will not excuse
the party whose negligence caused the injury complained of, in an action
by the child. Stout v. Millroad Co., 22.
3. Although a parent lie negligent, and permit a child of tender years to
wander off from his home and go upon a railroad "turn-table," and the
child there receives a serious injury, if the child was young and inexper.
enced, and not possessed of sufficient judgmcntto warn him of the danger
of the place orthe liaracter of theniachinery where theaccident occurred,
and the accident was the result of carelessness and neglect of the railroad
company, still there would be a liability upon the part of the companyfor
the injury sustained. Id.
4. It devolves upon a railroad company to protect its machinery and
"turntables," by fastening or inclosing the same, if they are in public
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places or where children are wont to resort for play, if this fact isbrought
home to the knowledge of the company; but if such machinery be remote
from public places, and no danger could be reasonably apprchended from
its being unfastened or uninclosed, and if it be the custom of other pru-
dently managed railroad companies not to fasten or inclose similar ma-
chinery, then no such degree of care and diligence could be required of the
defendant, and it would not be liable. Id.
5. A railrbad companyis liable to a hackman for an injuryreeived from
a defect Iu their platform, whill he was carrying a passenger to the depot.
Tobin v. .Portlend R. R. Co., 597.
6. And this, notwithstanding the platform was within the limits of a
highway. Id.
7. The general railroad laws of New York are to be construed harmoni-
ously as regards their provisions, and strictly as to the rights of parties.
Maler of N1. Y &R. B. A Co., 7-22.
8. By conforming to the provisions of those laws corporations acquire
a title in fee to the land necessary for their purposes. 1d.
9. An occupant of land cannot be deprived of the actual notice required
by the legislature to be given to him of the proposed route. Id.
10. A railroad company is not liable to its fireman for an injury resulting
from misplacement of a switch, where it is not traced to the company or
its employees. Tinney, adm'x v. Boston & Albany A.R., 723.
11. COUYT SUBSCRIPTIONS TO RAILROAD CORPORATIONS, 737.
REAL ESTATE.
In a writ of entry, if the tenant disclaims a part or all of the land de-
manded, he thereby admits the demandant's title, but such admission and
estoppel is not final and conclusive until after judgment, and he may
amend his disclaimer at any time before judgment. rells v. Manufaclur-
iug Co., 56.
RECONSTRUCTION See MILITARY SERVIcE.
RECORD. See JUDGmExT, 10.
1. It is competent to show by paroZ evidence the contents of a lost
record. Ferguson v. Tell el at., 270.
2. A paper. not entitled to be recorded by law, will not operate as con-
structive notice, by placing it on record. Glenn v. Davis, 532.
RELIGIOUS SOCIETY. See CHARITABLE USE; CHURCH; RES ADJUDICATA.
REMAINDER AND REVERSION. See EASEMENT, 0.
REPLE VIN.
1. Will not lie to recover possession of goods seized under an execution
regular on its face, and issued by the proper authority. Wlrestenberged v.
hlheaton, 133.
9. An avowry that the taking of the goods was on premises leased for
which rent was ill arrear, is good in form, without an allegation that the
distress was for that rent. Baird v..Porter, 269.
3. Such avowry would be good in substance when the plaintiff had de-
clared in the .Petinuit. Id.
4. The landlord has neither a special nor general property in goods dis-
trained for rent, sufficient to entitle him to possession after service of the
replevin. Id.
5. That the goods were taken as a distress is no justification under a
declarationin the detinet. Id.
RES ADJUDICATA. See JUuDG.IE.T.!).
1. Where the pendeney of prior suit is set up to defeat another, the case
must be the same; there must be the same parties, or at least such as
represent the same interest; there must be the same rights asserted and
the same relief prayed for. This relief must be founded on the same facts
and the title or essential basis of the relief must be the same. Watson v.
Jones, 430.
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'2. The property which is the subject-matter of dispute being in posses.
sion of the marshal of the Louisville Chancery Court as receiver, this
court will not interfere with his possession, nor will it enjoin from receiv-
ing it parties to whom the marshal is ordered by the Chancery Court to
deliver it. Id.
3. Where a subject-matter of dispute Is strictly and purely ecclesiastical
in its cllracter; matter which concerns theological controversy, chulch
discipline, ecclesiastical government or the conformity of the members of
the church to the standard of morals required of them, the ecclesiastical
tribunal is the judge of its own jurisdiction, land its decisions upon that
subject, as well as on the merits of the case, are conclusive upon the civil
courts. Id.
4. The cases of ecelesfitical matters which come before civil courts
classified and discussed by MiLaxa, J. Id.
REVIEW.
1. In actions of review the whole subject of amending the pleadings and
admitting new, is within the descretion of the court. Colebrook v. Med-
til, 335.
2. In the trial of an action upon review, the court may reject or allow a
demurrer to the original declaration. Id.
3. Upon review, nothing which has arisen since the judgment in the ori-
ginal cause can be pleaded in bar of the maintenance of the suit. Zour
v. .Tnvrin, 336.
4. An action of review is a ehose in action which vests in an assignee in
bankruptcy, who can alone prosecute or defend it. Id.
RIPARIAN OWNER.
The owner of lands bordering a navigable stream, may maintain trespass
against one who uses the land between the ebb and flow for fishing and
moving boats. Witsked v. Rurham,72
ROAD. See EAssxxT, 7; TowN, 1.
SALE. See VTzNnO.
SCHOOL. See CowSTirurzOeAr. L.Aw, 20.
SEAL.
1. Where it is sought to bind one who cannot read by an instrument un-
der seal, it must be shown thatit wasread to him. Dorsheimer v. Rorback
773.
2. M1oney paid under such an instrument which is invalid and void, will
I furnish no protection to those'relying on it, though paid in good faith.
id.
SET-OFF. See BANX, 1; HUSBAND AND Wirp, 27.
1. The obligee in a bond of indemnity, has no, cause of action against the
obliger, which he can set-off in an action against himself by the obligor,
unless he has suffered a loss covered by the bonid. Abeles v. Cohen, 52.
2. A State being sovereign, is not liable to be sued by an individual, and
no right of set-off exists in the actions instituted by it, unless expressly,
allowed by statute. State of Maryland v. B. & 0. B. P., 55.
SEWER. See 3ulIcIP.L CORORAtION, 17.
SHERIFF.
1. Though the rule Is, that as between parties, the return of the sheriff is
conclusive, it is not to be construed so as to prevent inquiry in original
process, as to whether the place where the summons was left was the resl-
dence of the defendant or not. Bond v. Nirlson, 'i.
2. A sheriff's return is part of the record, and on a sale confirmed by the
court, he cannot be allowed to show that he has' not received the purchase-
money, where the return is that he collected it. Ferguson v. Tt iet al., 270.
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3. A sheriffs sale may be confirmed at any time after return. Id.
4. After confirmation, itis too late for the sheriff or his sureties to raise
any question as to irregularity. Id.
$1IIPPING
1. Where materials are furnishedor repairs made to a vessel inher home
port, no maritime lien arises therefor, although the vessel is engaged in
foreign trade. The Edith, 214.
2. There being no maritime lien, neither the shipwright nor material
man is entitled to share in the proceeds arising from the sale of the vessel
underadmiralty process, as againsta mortgagee orassignee in bankruptcy.
Id.
3. The Act of April 24th, 1M2, of New York [Sess. Laws of 1862, chap. 482],
so far as it provides for enforcing a maritime contract by proceedings in
rem against a vessel, is unconstitutional and void. Id.
4. A held a mortgage on one-half of a vessel, and B a subsequent mort-
gage on three-fourtls. The owner becoming bankrupt, the vessel was sold
by proceedings in admiralty, and the fund produced was insufficient tW
pay both mortgages. )Hkld, that A's mortgage was to be treated as the
first lien on one-half of the fund, and that such half must be regarded as
composed of two separate funds or quarters, one subject to A's mortgage
alone, and onesubject first, to A's, and, secondly, to B's mortgage and,
as to the other half, B's mortgage was the first lien. One-quarter being
more than sufficient to pay A's mortgage, payment was first made of that
and then the surplus passed to the assignee in bankruptcy, and the re-
maining three-quarters of the fund went to the payment of B's mortgage.
Id.
5. The majority in interest, of the owners of a vessel, are entitled to
the possession and con trol of her, as against the nmster, although the mas-
ter is a part owner. Child's v. Gladding, 36.
6. The majority in interest may dismiss the master though a part owner,
at any time they see fit. Id.
7. A mortgage of a vessel before It is registered or enrolled, Is valid If
recorded according to the State laws. Perkia v. EMerson, 464.
8. If registered, it will only be valid as to the mortgagor, unless recorded
agreeably to the United States laws. 1d.
9. The power of a master to bind the owners for repairs, only extends
to the value of the ship and freight. Stirling v. Nevassa Phosphate Cb.
598.
10. The owner of the cargo, where the expenses have been thrown on it,
has a right to call on the owner of the ship for contribution, to the extent
of the ship and freight. Id.
11. The master cannot do what a prudent owner it present, would not
do, and the law presumes an owner would not repair beyond the value of
the ship and freight. Id.
12. Where ship, freight and cargo are pledged by a master for repairs,
and the proceeds of the ship and freight are insufficient to pay them, it is
fair to presume that the master acted In behalf of the owner of the cargo.
Id.
13. The master may sometimes act as the agent 6f the owner of the car-
go. Id.
14. Where he acts for all parties the loss falls on the owners of the ship
and cargo in proportion to their interests. Id.
15. The rule that "if two ships, one of which is a sailing ship and the
other a steamship, are proceeding in such direction as to involve risk of
collision, the steamship shall keep out of the way of the sailing ship,"
applies to the case of a tug with her tow lashed alongside; the tug and her
tow are considered as one vessel, and that a steam vessel. .ailroud Co.r.
Schooner Manton, 769.
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9. It is unnecessary in a declaration to aver that the words were uttered,
of and concerning the plaintiff, where the declarationavers thattley were
uttered of and to him. I.
SIDEWALK. See lIGHwAY, 12.
SLANDER. See DAsAGs, 7,9,11
1. Calling one a thief for stealing a tree or other thing adhering to the
freehold is not actionable. Stitzel v. Reynolds and Wife. 133.
2. Charging one with willfully taking fruit, made a misdemeanor by Act
of Assembly is not actionable. Id.
3. To constitute slander the words spoken must impute an offense both
indictable and infamous. 7d.
4. Where the words are per se actionable, and are spoken in a moment of
passion caused by improper conduct of the plaintiff, though the circlum-
stances are not a complete defense, they may be considered in mitigation
ofdamages. Miles v. Barrington, 336
5. Where the plaintiff proved the speaking of other defamatory words
by the defendant, to show malice, the defendant will not be allowed to
ask the witness how he understood them. Bhaw v. Shaw, 36.
4. Such inquiry will be allowed only in reference to the words charged
in the declaration, when they are ambiguous. Id.
7. In an action of slander it is not proper to read to a witness the words
laid in the declaration, and then interrogate him concerning them. Osborn
V. Forshee, 598.
S. The testimony of a witness on the trial of an action of slander, in
which he acknowledged the utterance of certain words alleged as slander-
ous, cannot be proved as an admission in an action against him. Id.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
1. A representation made by mistake and not substantially affecting the
rights of the parties is no bar to specific performance. Wuesthoff v. &y-
Inour, 57.
2. Will not be enforced where the contract does not designate with cer-
tainty the lands to be conveyed. Ctnr v.. Passaic Land Co., 57.
3. Will not be decreed of any contract when any material parts of the
terms are uncertain. iwhols v. Williams, 266.
STAMPS. See EvrDrrcE, 8.
1. STAMPS. 137.
2. To authorize a court to declare an instrument "invalid and of no
effect" for want of a stamp, it must affirmatively appear that the omission
was the result of an attempt to evade the statute. Brownv. Thompson,
599.
3. A note to which a stamp has been aflixed by the collector subsequent to
its issue, is valid to all intents and p urposes. Aldrich v. RBagan, 723.
STATUTES. See LEGAL TENDER NoTs, 2.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS. See FRAUDS.
STEAMBOAT. See Commox CARREV, 12.
A steam vessel having complied with the Act of February 28,1871, and
the Rules of the Board of Supervising Inspectors, and the Secretary of
the Treasury, by placing on board a register adopted by said board and
Secretary, which is insufficient, is not liable to seizure for having in use
an Imperfect register requiring frequent repairs. The Lac .LaBelle, 557.
STOCKHOLDER. See CoRPoSATIox, 1.
STREET. See HIGHWAY.
1. The authorities of a town are not relieved from the obligation to re-
move dangerous nuisances from the streets though a railroad has an ease-
ment over them. Norristown v. Moyer, 199.
2. The use by a citizen of a public way is for transit only, with such
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stoppages as are absolutely necessary. rd.
3. Loungers are Obstructions of the public right of way, and nuisances.
rd.
4. Where plaintiff was injured while lawfully in a street, by a falling
pole, the town will be liable whether the neglect to remove the pole wai
willful or not. Id.
5. A mere plat of lan- laying off streets, blocks and house, in a city is
not a dedication of th' streets to public uqe; the city authorities 1nnVt
afflrirmatively recciv, and adopt them. Parsons v. Atlanta Uaiversily, 3)j-
G. In the abience of formal acceptance, there must be clear proof of con-
tinuous use for a reasonable time. Id.
7. Where the public are enjoined from opening a street. a private citizen
cannot bave an injunction to prevent tile street being obstructed, unless
he shows special damage, pending the former injunction. Id.
SUBROGATION. See BiLs AwD NoTEs, 12.
SUNDAY.
Where a contract for labor has been performed it cannot be defended on
the ground that it was made on the SabbatL ierriwetherv.,ra'mh,399.
SURETY. See BANr, 4.
1. A surety who has not obtained a judgment against his principal in his
life-time nor obtained an allowance of the claim against his estate, cannot
maintain a bill to set aside a conveyance made by the principal, on the
ground that it was fraudulent as to creditors. .fgge v. Ewivng, 127.
2. Where A obtains an accommodation acceptance of R by giving his
note with a surety as security, and renews the acceptance without the
surety's consent, the sureti is discharged. Thomas v. letson, 599.
TAXATION See CITZzE, 7.
1. If the supervisor of a township, in making the assessment of property
for taxation, shall fraudulently, and with a view to impose upon an indi-
vidual more than his just proportion of the public burden of taxation,
assess the property of such individual above its value, and relatively
above the other assessments on his roll, the party aggrieved may have an
injunction to restrain the collection of the excessive tax. 3ferriUlv. Hum
phrey . 208.
2. A property owner seeking to enjoin the collection of taxes on the
ground that the amount is excessive, should show by his bill, as near as
may be practicable, what amount s just, and what excessive, and he
should pay to the proper officer the amount which he concedes to be pro.
perly chargeable against him In the case of a personal tax, a preliminary
injunction should not be awarded in such case except upon the terms that
the whole amount in dispute be paid into court, or proper security given
for its ultimaete pivment if it shall be decreed by the court; and in any
other case. tie officer allowing an injunction has a discretion to require
such security, which it may sometimes be proper he should exercise.
id
3. lie who seeks equity must do equity; and he who seeks to enjoin the
collection of an excessive tax, must be required as a condition of relief to
pay such an amount as is just. Id
4. Where therefore, a bill was filed to restrain the collection of an exces-
sive tax, and the court found the tax to be exe,,ssive, and thereupon made
a decree perpetually enjoining the collection not only of the amnount, that
wvas excessive, but of the whole tax, it was held thatthe decree was wholly
unwarranted, and it was thereupon reversed Id
5. An asiessor of internal revenue hlas power to reassess an income-tax
where he is satisfied it is incorrect, although tile party has paid the tax
flrst assessed against lim. Doll v. Evans. 315
G. Where the assessor finds the first return to be false or fraudulent, it is
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his duty to add a penalty of one hundred per' cent, on the second assess
ment Id.
7. The Act of Congress which imposes an addition of one hundred per
centum to the tax ,as a penalty for the "return of a false or fraudulent
list or valuation," is constitutional. Id.
& Goods imported from a foreign country, upon which the duties and
charges at the custom-house have been paid, are not subject to State taxa_
tion whilst remaining in the original cases, unbroken and unsold, in the
hands of the importer, whether the tax he imposed upon the goods as im-
ports, or upon the goods as part of the general property of the citizens
of the State which is subJected to an ad valorem tax. Low v. Austin,
S66.
9. Goods imported do not lose their character as imports, and become
incorporated into the mass of property of the State untilthey have passed
from the control of the importer, or been broken up by him from their
original cases. Id.
10. Assessors of real estate act in a judicial I capacity, and must be gov-
erned by the evidence presented to them. 2re 2'eople v. Anmerican Thread
Cb., 459.
11. Where the only evidence is that of the owner, and it is uncontradict-
ed, it is conclusive. Id.
11 A collector who fails to restore the balance, after paying the taxes
out ofa sale of distress, is a trespasser ib into. Carter v. Allen, 463.
13 In Maine, in order to sustain a title under a tax deed from the county
treasurer, it must affirmatively appear that all the provisions of law have
been strictly complied with. Savage v Holyoke, 463.
14 When a party has a general deposit of current funds in a bank, and
on the 28th day of February gives a check for such funds payable in legal
tender notes, and notes of that character are handed to him, and he makes
a special deposit of such notes in the same bank, and three days afterward
changes his special deposit of legal tender notes into a general deposit of
current funds, and where the whole transaction is forthe sole and express
purpose of escaping taxation on such deposit;: Held, that as to the govern-
ment, the transaction was void, and the actor not entitled to theinterven-
tion of the courts to be relieved from the taxes imposed on such deposits.
Mitchell v. Leavenworth Co., 626.
TENANT FOR YEARS. See LAwDLOna AND TNAawT, 2.
An estate for years may be bought and sold against the consent'of the
grantor unless the deed prevents it. Clark v. Herring & Mock, 33L
TENANT IN COMMON.
1. Where one tenant in common in remainder erects buildings on the
property with the consent of the life tenant and1 receives the rents, he will
not be allowed to hold the buildings after the death of the life tenant, and
ie must account for the rents received since his death. Scott v. Guernsey,
134.
2. A tenant in common in possession of the property, is liable for rent
only when he agrees to pay it. Id.
3. A tenant in common receiving rents, is liable to pay interest on the
sums received without previous demand. Id.
4. An action on the case sounding in tort, may be maintained by one ten-
ant in common against his co-tenant, for misuse of the common property.
.cClellan v. Genness, 134.
5. A tenant in common is not In general accountable to his co-tenant for
rents, but when he takes possession and excludes his co-tenant, he must
account, deducting taxes and repairs. Davidson v. Thompson, 134.
6. Where an inheritance consists of several distinct frecholds, a tenant
In common may convey his undivided interestinany one or more of them,
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and it may be sold on execution without reference to any of the other par-
cels. Butler V. Boy., 57;0.
7. Vhcre such an inhlrritanceo" etate e i Lts of sep.trata city lots which
have bein platted, each lot is prsum ,l to b it a scparat holding, in the ab-
seueof evidence showingsuch a combined use, or such at subjection to
some common lease or charge as would ijake them in faLct one freehold,
and make it impossible to sever them without injustice. Id.
TENDER
1 Subjecttoacondition is invalid. Draper v. Hill, 43.
2. Adebtormay makea ten'13ratany tim3 bsfore trial and s~tve himself
from future costs. Sweetland v. Tuthill, 135.
3. A tender of less than debt, interest, and costs, is not g Pl, I'l.
4. A verdict for less than the amount tendered is not good. Id.
5. The samestrictness as to tender is re:luired in equity as in law, and on
plea or answer the money must be paid into conrt. Shields v. Lozear, 270.
TITLE. See Cacacu, 3; l)EBTOR AND CREDITOR, 19; EXECUTION.
Actual possession of the land is notice of the title of the party in posses-
sion. Russell v. Sweezey, 453.
TOWN. SEE IlIGW. , STREEr, 4.
1. It is the duty of towns to build and repair their roads in such a way
as to be reasonably safe from such accidents as might Justly be expected
to occur on their roads. Hodge v. Town of Bennington, 59.
2. Selectmen of a town in New Hampshire have not authority to borrow
money. Rich v. Errol 72-3.
3. The bona fide holder of a note issued by the selectmen of a town. must
show that it was authorized by a vote of the town. ITd.
TREASURY NOTES. See CouRTs, 5.
TRESPASS. See FENCES; RIPA.RIAN OWNER.
1. The owner ofa freehold has the right to repel intrusion by necessary
force. Harrison v. Harrison, 44.
2. The defendant, the minor son of S., was directed by his father to see
that no one interfered with an aqueduct upon his father's premises, and
having learned that the plaintiff, with whom his father had had trouble
about the aqueduct, was about to interfere with it, went to the boundary
of the land where the aqueduct was, and but a few feet from It. and found
the plaintiff about to enter upon the land, on his way to the aqueduct. The
defendant forbade the plaintiff's entering upon the land; the plaintiff per-
sisted in doing so, and sprang over the fence in a threatening manner:
.Held, that defendant might rightfully resist the further approach of the
plaintiff, using no unnecessary force. .d.
3. Where the plea to a declaration for assault and battery is son assault
demesne and the application de injuria, all the averments of the plea are
put in issue; and if the plaintiff made the first assault, he can recover only
for the excess of force used in a defense. Id.
4. When a party is assaulted, the degree of force which he may employ
in repelling the assault depends to some extent upon the known character
of the assailant-whether peaceable or quarrelsome. Id.
5. The defmdant offered to prove that "plaintiff was reportedtobe--and
was in fact-a quarrelsome man, with a violent and uncontrollable tem-
per; and this was known to the defendant at the time of theaffriy,"whiel1
was excluded by the court: Hreld, that this evidence should have been re-
ceived. d.
6. The owner of personal property on the land of another, cannot com-
mit a trespass by entering and taking it away. Crrpen!cr v. Talsey, 62.
7. This rule does not apply to one entering in order to make a partition
fence. Id.
8. An unrecovered deed under which the plaintiff never had possession
s not sufficient evidence to maintain an action of trespass quare clausurn.
Savage v. Holyoke, 464.
53
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9. A plaintiff will not be denied the right to recover, in trespass guare
clausum, the actual damages he has suffered, because their nature is such
that they cannot be accurately measured. Tlbertv.Kenndey, 599.
10. The rule that a party aggrieved by a trespass, cannot recover dam-
ages resulting from his neglect to employ ordinary means to prevent or
lessen them, is simply one of good faith; he may recover for all that rea-
sonable diligence would not have averted. & t.
11. Where B seized A by the arm and swung him violently around two
or three times, then letting him go, and A having thus been made dizzy,
involuntarily passed rapidly in the direction of and came violently against
C, who instantly pushed him away, and A then came in contact with a
hook, and sustained an injury: Held, that A. might maintain trespass vi di
arn f against B. _,tctke v. Freeman, 692.
12. There was no error in the following instructious to the jury: "That
they should inquire who was the first actor or the procuring cause of the
injury to A; that B would be liable if the wrongful force which he gave AL
carried him on to the hook, or if such force combined with the new force
given to him by C. produced the result; but if the jury should find that
the injury received by A resulted entirely from the push of C alone, unnas
sisted by the act of B, then B would not be liable; or in otlierwords, if the
original forcegiven to AbyB had ceased, or time was given to C for reflec.
tion and deliberation before he gave his push, then B would not be liable;
that the jury should determine whether the force, originally commenced
by B, did at any time cease, and whether it was not directly continued up
to the time A struck the hook bythe direct agency of B, C lending his aid
wittingly or unwittingly to the injury, or whether C, bypushing him from
his person, did more than to act in self-defeuse, and was not justified under
the circumstances, in order to save his person and himself from present
danger; that the jury should determine also, whether from the time A
was first seized by B and until-the injury was done he could exercise any
self-control over his own person, or could in any wayhave preventedwhat
happened to him." Id.
13. Where an injury is the result of two occurring causes, one party In
fault is not exempted from full liability for the injury, although another
party maybe equally culpable. Id.
TROVER. See BILMEmNT, 3; HUSnAwDAxD WzPi14.
1. A defendant in trover who relies on a title by prescription, cannot
tack to his possession that of prior holders, unless he shows that it is bona
fide. Worthy v. Einaman, 399.
2. Will lie by a joint owner of a note against another joint owner, who
surrenders it without authority to the drawer to be destroyed. Einner v.
-Penniman, 464.
TRUST AWD TRUSTEE. See Chuncif, 5; CORPoRATbozr, 12; DEBToR A" CnzD.
roa. I; GuAanrAzc.
1. The court of the State where the cestuf que trust resides, has jurddlc-
tion to appoint a trustee in the place of one dying, although such trustee
removed from the State and took the fund with him. Ourlti v. BSmith, 63.
2. Where a bequest is made in a will in trust in the executor, and an ad-
ministrator de bonis non wrongfully perverts the trust funds and is re-
moved by the probate court (never having given bonds as trustee and
never having rendered an account to the probate court as administrator),
and a successor is appointed, the latter may invoke a court of equity to
reach the funds and bring them to the use provided in the will. Abell v.
Howe, 144.
3. Where a purchaser of trust property has notice of the trust, beforetbe
money to the full value of the property is paid over and Is beyond his
power to reach, he cannot be regarded as an innocent bonafide purchaser.
Md.%
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4. Where an attorney has notice of a trust, the law will presume the no-
tice was communicated to the client, and if this knowledge comes to the
attorney or agent while acting in another and different transaction, the
client and principal will be affected with notice. Id.
5. Therefore, where such recusant administrator invested such trust
funds in a house and lot, taking the title to himself without mentioning
the trust, and his creditor attached the same but abandoned the suit upon
the debtor's conveying the same to the creditor's attorney with directions
to pay the creditor his debt out of the avails, and the attorney knowing of
the trust when hetook thetitle holds the avails claiming thatheshould first
pay said debt out of them, it was Held, that the creditor was not an in-
nocent purchaser for value, and that he had entered his suit and obtained
judgment and had the premises set off on execution, lie would have ob-
tained no title because his debtor had none in equity, and in a suit in
chancery in favor of the present administrator against such recusant ad-
ministrator, creditorand attorney, a decree was made for the oratoragainst
all tile defendants for the amount of the money in the attorney's hands,
received from the sale of the premises, which he held forthe benefit of the
creditor, and to the amount of his debt, and against the executor and at-
torney for the residue received by the attorney in said sale, with interest
from the time of the sale. Id.
6. A trustee who is not chargeable and is not guilty of fraud or unneces-
sary delay is entitled to costs. Kent v. Hutchins, 271.
7. But a trustee guilty of any fraudulent act enumerated in sec. 43 of
statutes of New Hampshire must pay costs though not chargeable. d.
8. A declaration of trust though not executed at the same time and
place as the deed whose purposes it declares, if dated the same day, and
being the consideration of it must be considered with It. Owne3 v.
Ownes, 776.
9. A declaration of trust by an Infant, by a deed actually delivered, Is
voidable but not void. Id.
UNITED STATES COURTS. See ERRORS AND APPEALS 4; HABEAS CORPUS.
USURY. See BoNDs AND NOTES 14, 17,18.
A sale of mortgage securities at a premium, cannot subjwet the party to
an action to recover the premium on the ground of usury. Culver v. Bige-
low, 13..
VENDOR AND PURCHASER. See AGENT 10; HUSBAND AND WIFE 1 2; LtcENSE' 1.
I. Beal Estate.
1. Where the purchaser agrees to pay the balance of the purchase-money
in sixty days, when the deed is to be delivered, if the money is not paid
nor the deed tendered at the expiration of the time, the performance be-
comes indefinite, but mutual and dependent when it does occur. L vin v.
Bleakley, 135.
2. Whichever party first desires performance is bound to perform or ten-
der performance of his part of the contract. .d.
3. Where vendor proceeds on hs legal title, a tender is not necessary. Id.
4. A vendee cannot insist upon a recission on the ground of encumbran-
ces, when he-owes unpaid purchase-money sufficient to discharge them Id-
5 In an action by the equitable owner of land agitinst the holder of the
legal title, to obtain a decree for the legal title, where the equitable owner
has been in possession all the time, ajudgmenutfor damages is erroneous
Moore v Wade, 264.
6. The covenant of seisin is broken as soon as the deed is executed, if
the title is bad. Dale v. Shirely, 271.
7. The damages for breach, as a general rule is the consideration-money
and interest. Id
8. Where a vendee buys In paramount title his recovery will be limited
to the amount he pays and interest. 1'.
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9. In some cases the vendee may also recover the costs and attorney's
fees paid inl defending a suit in reference to the land. Id.
10. The pre-emptor of territorial land under the Act of Congress of Sep-
tember 4th, 1841, is restrained from aliening it (with certain exceptions)
before entry in the land office, but after entry he may sell and pass a valid
title without waiting for the issue of his patent. Myers v. ¥oft, 608.
11. The competeneyofacorpolation, gruntee totake title to laud, cannot
be disputed by a grantor who ias delivered a deed and received the con-
sideration, or by any one claiming through him by subsequent convey-
ance. Id.
12. It is unnecessary for the purchaser of real estate to offerto pay the
unpaid purchase-money to his vendor who has resold, before bringing suit.
Hawley v. Keeler, 724.
13. Ina suit to foreclose a vendor's lien it is necessary to make subse-
quent purchasers, whose possession is knownto the vendor, parties to the
suit, otherwise their interest is not foreclosed..Ming v. The .Building
Association, 760.
14. The recording of a deed in the registry of mortgages in an invalid
registry of the deed as such, and imposes no legal or constructive notice
upon third persons, but proof of actual notice is quite as effectual as con-
structive notice. Id.
15. Lands encumbered with a vendor's lien for the unpaid portion of the
purchase-money having been sold by the vendee to ajoint stock company,
and title conveyed to a trustee for said company : Held, that the stock-
holders of said joint stock company, there being no trustee at the time to
represent them, are -proper parties to a bill to redeem said lands from a
purchaser at sheriff's sale under proceedings by the vendor against the
orlginal vendee solely to foreclose his lien. Id.
U. -Personal 1.o-ertpy.
16. In case of warranty or fraud in the sale of chattels, the property may
be retained by the vendee and the sale affirmed, yet his right to sue upon
the warranty, or for the deceit, will not thereby be affected. Gilson v.
Bingham, 73.
17. If thl vendee of an article manufactured for him under a special
executory contract, there being no warranty: or fraud, accept it, though.
defective, lie becomes thereby bound to pay the contract price; but if he
reject it and give notice of the non-acceptance, lie can bring his action for
the non-perforinauce of the contract ; but he caunot accept it and bring
such action; nor can he accept it and impose onditions and sue the ven-
dor for non-compliance with the conditions imposed Id.
18. A judgment recovered by the vendor for the balance of the price due
for an article manufactured to order inder a special contract, is a bar to a
suit brought by the vendee for a breach of the contract. Id.
19. To nmintain an action for goods bargahed and sold the property'
must have passed to the vendee, even if the goods are not delivered. Gor-
dony. Norris, 271.
20. The measure of damages is the contractprice of the goods. Id.
21. If the vendee refuses to receive and pay for the goods the vendor's
measure of damages is the difference between contract price and the
market price at the tiie they should have been received. Id.
:N. But in case of a statue, picture or a specific article nmde according to
order, the vendor may recover the full contract price. Id.
23. The vendor may sell the goods at auction, ind recover the difference
between the price realized and the contract price. Id.
24. The validity of a vendor's clain to recover the price of goods sold
with kiiowlcdge that the purchaser intends to make an unlawful use of
them, depends upon the circumstances whether or not the original vendor
participated actively, to a greater or less extent, in the subsequent ulaw-
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ful disposition of the goods; or, whether the expectation of advantage
and profit to him, growing out of the unlawful disposition of the goods
by the purchaser, entered into and constituted a part of the inducement
and consideration of the original sale. hull v. .pear, 497. -
25. If such expectation of advantage to the vendor was an ingredient in
the consideration for the original sale, or if the original vendor partici-
pated in the subsequent unlawful disposition of the goods, he cannot
recover the price of them in our courts. Id.
2 . Afere belief on the part of the seller of goods that the purchaser buys
for the purpose of carrying them into another State. to be there resold in
violation of law, does not invalidate the sale. Id.
27. The mere solicitation, by a dealer in liquors, of orders in the future
for such goods, even though the person soliciting such orders may have
had reatson to believe, and did believe, that if such liquors should be order-
ed and purchased they would be resold by the purchaser in violation ot
law, is not such a circumstance as will affect the validity of a subsequent
sale of such goods in a State where such sale is not prohibited by law. Id.
28. In the absence of any agreement tie dehvery of goods by a vendor
to a railroad is no delivery to the purchaser. Everett v. arks 724
29. The silence of a vendor as to a defect in his property which a buyer
does not know, is a moral but not a legal fraud. JHowell v. Biddlecom, 7,24.
30. But if by acts or words the vendor leads the buyer astray, inducing
him to suppose he buys with warranty, or preventing examination or
Inquiry, it is a fraud the law will take notice of. Td.
VENUE.
To a suit on a note, in New Hampshire, where a statute provides "that
transitory actions in which both parties are inhabitants of the State, may
be brought in the county of which either party is an inhabitant," a plea
averring that the endorsement was made for the sole purpose of enabling
the endorser to bring suit in the county in which he lived, and that the
real owner resided in another county where the defendant did, was held
good. Parsons v. Brown, 261.
VERDICT. See DA.AOES, 4.
1. Where the verdict is ambiguous the court may send out the jury for
further deliberation. Eransv. .Foss, 272.
2. A sealed verdict without the direction of the cout or the consent ot
the parties, will not be disturbed unless some fraud was practiced. 2d.
WAIVEI. See INSURANCE. 19.
The question of waiver is one of intention; mere occupation of a build-
ing by tie owner is iot a waiver of strict performance. Wells v. elwood,
399.
W-1II. See ONFEDEItATE STATES. 5; INSURANCE, 7.
Title by capture during war, can only be set up by the recognized par-
ties to the war. orlhy v. Kinavian, 39.
W AiIItANTY. See EASEMENT. 3; VENDOR AND rURCHASzn, 16.
1. Where the plaintiff and defonlant exchanged horses, there being a
claim on the paintirs horse in favor of a conditional venlor, and the
plaintiffafterward brought suit for false warinty, the defendant was not
allowed to avail himself of such objection to the title as a defense, N1 bll
he had not been disturbed in possession, and the plaintiff had paid til
claim. Clayton v. &olt, 55.
2. The purchaser may bring an action at once, for breach ofwarranty oil
the sale of goods without returning them. Wells v. Selwood, 399.
3. His possession and their value wilt be considered in estimating the
damages. Id.
4. lie is entitled to a reasonable time in which to examine the goods. Id.
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES. See EASEMENT, 2.
M) INDEX.
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1. The owner of land which is being inundated by a stream breaking
away from its channel, may legally turn it back to its old channel, but has
no right to cause it to flow on the land of another, except in such old chan-
nel. Tuhill v.SoUt, 63.
2. A party securing the right of flowage from adjacent laud-owners for
purposes ofwater-power, and then stocking the pond with fish, does not
acquire an exclusive right offishing. Damonv. Felch, 272.
3. Twenty years' maintenance ofa dam without a flshway, will not givea
prescriptive right to such dam as against the public. State v. FZranklin
17alls Cb., 272.
4. Every owner of land has the right to clean put and tube up a natural
spring upon his land, even though it should result in an increased flow of
water over the land of his neighbor. Waffle v. Porter, 400.
WAT. See ALLEY.
WITNESS. See EQUITY, 5; INFANT, 2; SL&NDea, 8.
1. Every person, whatever his office or dignity, is bound to appear and
testify in a court ofjustice when required by legal process, unless he hasa
lawful excuse. Thompson v. German Valley B Co., 128.
2. An order to testify is an unusual, if not an unheard-of practice, and
ought not to be made against the Executive of a State. rd.
3. The governor will not be compeled to produce in court any paper,
which in his opinion his official duty requires hhn to withhold. Id.
4. Ifa governor refuses to appear and testify, his liability to respond in
damages to the party injured, is the same as any other citizen. Id.
5. The credibility of witnesses belongs to the j Ury, and any instructions
of the court tending to influence the jury on the question of credit would
be wrong. Martin v. The People, 136.
6. Any witness may testify, that a person was intoxicated, or under the
Influence of intoxicating liquor. tate v. -ike, 233.
7. The opinion of a witness, who isnot an expert, as to the sanity of a re.
spondent, is incompetent, although formed from observation of the re-
spondent's appearance and conduct. rd.
8. A partner who has assigned all his interest to a co-partner, is not a
competent witness to prove that a deceased partner was to be allowed a
compensation for his services in managing the business. Lyon v. Err's
of Snyder, 400.
9. In an action by an executrix on a note, made by one defendant, and
endorsed by the others to the testator, the maker is incompetent as a wit.
ness to prove that it was usurious. id.
10. Where the action is begun by the service of a summons upon the ma-
ker and endorsor of a note, the fact that the maker does not enter an ap-
pearance, makes him none the less a party to the action, and as such in-
competent as a witness, against a plaintiff suing 'an executrix. Id.
11. A wife is a competent witness against her husband in the trial of an
indictment for procuring her mijcarriage. State of Maine v. Dyer, 5M2.
12. In an issue to try the validity of a will, the-beneflciarles under the
will being parties to the action, are competent witnesses in favor of the
will. They are not within the exception in the statute which excludesthe
other parties where one of the original parties to the contract or cause of
action is dead. Garvin v. Wilh ias, 642.
13. Whether a witness offered as an expert has the legal qualifications
to entitle him to testify, is a question of fact to be decided by the court,
and is not subject to exception. Dole v. J.ohmon. 6-33.
14. The opinion of a witness not an expert is inadmissible, and wheth:"
an expert or not is a fact for the judge who tries the cause; Taylorv.
Boger Williams Ins. Cb., 722.
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